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SUMMARY 
 
 
Pre-eclampsia is a common and dangerous condition of pregnancy.  During clinical care the 
sensitive obstetrician will frequently recognise moral ambiguity and ethical conflicts. It is 
important to understand the pertinent issues and find ways of resolving them. 
  
Counselling is an important element of modern medicine.  In deciding which counselling model 
to apply, clinicians must consider many variables including the particular clinical scenario, 
strength of evidence, and the justifiable limits of paternalism and autonomy in a position of 
shared responsibility.  Couples have a moral right to procreate even when the pursuit of 
pregnancy involves significant risks.  However, with their understanding of care ethics as well as 
rights ethics, informed women are well placed to negotiate the extremes of these positions when 
deciding whether to risk a pregnancy or not.  The concept of the “fetal patient” is a helpful one.  
An autonomous woman may choose to confer or deny this status to her previable fetus, while 
obstetricians must balance autonomy- and beneficence-based obligations to the pregnant woman 
with beneficence-based obligations to her fetus. 
 
Maternal behaviour that harms the fetus and future child is categorised as maternal-fetal conflict.  
However, any pregnant woman is morally required to avoid harming the fetus, if this can be done 
without sacrificing her own important interests. The term non-compliance implies a hierarchical 
nature in the doctor-patient relationship. This reduces patient agency, erodes trust and conflicts 
with informed choice.  Although sometimes justified, this “label” generally does more harm than 
good. 
 
Expectant management of early pre-eclampsia recognises that neonatal intensive care is an 
expensive and limited resource. The ultimate goal of expectant management remains the safety of 
the mother and the delivery of a live infant who will not require intensive and prolonged neonatal 
care.  This judicious use of neonatal intensive care improves distributive justice but by 
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consenting to expectant management as an inpatient, the pregnant woman voluntarily restricts her 
freedom.  The decision is morally undergirded by the value accorded to the viable fetus and the 
scientific evidence informing the decision.  When an extremely preterm, growth restricted fetus 
requires delivery, resuscitation may become an issue for consideration.  The distinction between 
withholding resuscitation in such cases, or initiating but later withdrawing care is morally 
irrelevant.  Categories of optional and obligatory treatments are more helpful, but perinatologists 
must determine treatment thresholds through understanding the relevant data and ethics issues.  
 
Finally, women do not lose their rights when they become terminally ill.  When an undelivered 
woman is declared brain dead following complications of pre-eclampsia, her doctors and family 
must formulate clear plans for her and her living fetus.  She must still be treated with respect and 
her right to die with dignity not forgotten.  Extension of somatic support to optimise the outcome 
of her fetus can be supported ethically provided that the fetus is at the threshold of viability, the 
support is not prolonged (distributive justice), advanced level support is available with a 
successful outcome likely, and that doctors and family are in clear agreement. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
 
Pre-eklampsie is ‘n algemene en gevaarlike toestand van swangerskap.  Die verloskundige met ‘n 
fyn waarnemingsvermoë sal dikwels morele dubbelsinnigheid en etiese konflik tydens kliniese 
sorg erken.  Dit is belangrik om die kernaspekte te verstaan en maniere te vind om dit op te los. 
 
Berading is ‘n belangrike komponent van moderne geneeskunde.  Tydens besluitneming oor 
watter model van berading toegepas moet word, moet klinici ‘n aantal veranderlikes teen mekaar 
opweeg insluitend die spesifieke kliniese senario, sterkte van die getuienis, die geregverdigde 
perke van paternalisme en outonomie in ‘n posisie van gedeelde verantwoordelikheid.  Die 
egpare het ‘n morele reg om voort te plant selfs wanneer die verlange na swangerskap 
betekenisvolle risiko’s inhou.  Vrouens wat goed ingelig is, het die vermoë om die uiterstes van 
etiek van sorg en regte teen mekaar op te weeg wanneer hulle besluit om die risiko van 
swangerskap te loop.  Die konsep van “fetus as pasiënt” kan wel tot verdere besluitneming bydra.  
Die outonome vrou mag self besluit of die fetus daardie status het.  Aan die ander kant moet die 
verloskundige outonomie en goedwilligheid- (“beneficence”) gebasseerde verpligtinge teenoor 
die swanger vrou opweeg teen die goedwilligheid-gebasseerde verpligting teenoor haar fetus.  
Moederlike gedrag wat die fetus en toekomstige kind skend, word as ‘n moeder-fetus konflik 
beskou.  Enige swanger vrou is egter moreel verplig om nie die fetus skade te berokken nie, mits 
dit gedoen kan word sonder die prysgawe van haar eie noodsaaklike belange.  Die term “nie-
inskiklikheid” (“non-compliance”) impliseer hiërargie in die dokter-pasiëntverhouding.  Hierdie 
hiërargie doen afbreuk aan die besluitneming van die pasiënt, ondermyn vertroue en bots met 
ingeligte keuses.  Alhoewel besluitneming op grond van hiërargies-gebaseerde gesag soms 
geregverdig is, veroorsaak hierdie kategorisering gewoonlik meer kwaad as goed. 
 
Afwagtende hantering van vroeë pre-eklampsie gaan van die standpunt uit dat neonatale 
intensiewe sorg ‘n duur en skaars hulpbron is.  Die uiteindelike doel van afwagtende hantering 
bly die veiligheid en gesondheid van die ma en die verlossing van ‘n lewendige baba wat nie 
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verlengde intensiewe- en neonatale sorg benodig nie.  Hierdie oordeelkundige gebruik van 
neonatale sorg bevorder distributiewe geregtigheid, maar wanneer sy toestemming gee tot 
afwagtende behandeling as binnepasiënt, beperk die swanger vrou vrywilliglik haar vryheid.  
Hierdie besluit word moreel ondersteun deur die waarde wat aan die lewensvatbare fetus 
toegevoeg word en die wetenskaplike gronde waarop die besluit berus.  Wanneer ‘n erge 
voortydse, groeivertraagde fetus verlossing benodig, word ressussitasie soms iets wat oorweeg 
moet word.  Die onderskeid tussen die weerhouding van ressussitasie in sulke gevalle en die 
onttrekking van sorg waar dit aanvanklik begin is, is moreel irrelevant.  Kategorieë van opsionele 
en verpligte behandelings is meer behulpsaam, maar perinatoloë moet die behandelingsdrempels 
bepaal deur die relevante data en etiek te verstaan. 
 
Laastens, vroue verloor nie hul regte wanneer hulle terminaal siek word nie.  Wanneer die 
komplikasies van pre-eklampsie breindood van die vrou veroorsaak voor die verlossing van haar 
baba, moet haar dokters en familie duidelike planne vir die hantering van haar en haar fetus 
ontwikkel.  Sy moet nogsteeds met respek behandel word en haar reg om met waardigheid te 
sterf, mag nie uit die oog verloor word nie.  Verlenging van die ondersteuning van 
lewensfunksies om die uitkoms van haar fetus te verbeter, kan eties ondersteun word, mits die 
fetus na aan lewensvatbaarheid is, die ondersteuning nie te lank duur nie (distributiewe 
geregtigheid), gevorderde ondersteuning beskikbaar is met ‘n goeie kans vir suksesvolle uitkoms 
en dat die dokters en familie ten volle saamstem. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Pre-eclampsia in context 
 
Pre-eclampsia is a heterogeneous, pregnancy specific, hypertensive disorder which occurs in 2-
5% of pregnancies (Kenneth et al., 2010; Petit & Brown, 2012).  Although the aetiology is multi-
factorial and still not completely understood, a key component is inadequate placentation in the 
first trimester and defective trophoblast infiltration of the spiral arteries in the second trimester.  
Through different pathophysiologic pathways such as immune maladaption to paternal antigens, 
the process leads to exaggerated systemic inflammation affecting the maternal vascular 
endothelium, maternal organs and the placenta (Redman et al., 1999).  Thus the clinical findings 
of pre-eclampsia can manifest either as a maternal syndrome, a fetal syndrome or both (Sibai, 
2008).  
 
Pre-eclampsia and other hypertensive disorders of pregnancy are leading causes of maternal and 
perinatal morbidity and mortality both in developed and developing countries.  The World Health 
Organisation estimates that at least one woman dies every seven minutes from hypertensive 
disorders of pregnancy (von Dadelszen & Magee, 2008).  In South Africa and the United 
Kingdom, pre-eclampsia and other hypertensive disorders of pregnancy have had a persistent and 
strong association with maternal mortality (Saving Mothers 2008-2010; Saving Mother’s Lives, 
2011).  Complications of pre-eclampsia also constitute important causes of severe acute maternal 
morbidity in South Africa (Pattinson et al., 2003; Hall et al., 2006).  Pre-eclampsia exacts a toll 
on the fetus and neonate as well.  Hypertensive diseases of pregnancy have been shown to be 
important causes for delivery of very low-birth weight babies and perinatally related losses in 
South Africa (Odendaal et al., 2003; Taliep et al., 2010). 
 
The duration of normal pregnancy is generally accepted as nine months, but because periods of 
weeks, or even days can become critical in terms of outcomes, obstetric specialists and maternal-
fetal sub-specialists refer to gestation in terms of weeks (w) and days (d).  Normal pregnancy 
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lasts 40w and one week spans e.g. 39w0d – 39w6d. The terms fetus and baby are used 
interchangeably here but both refer to the undelivered child.  Viability is defined where 
necessary.  After birth, reference is made to the neonate or child.  While it is not necessary to 
discuss the classification of pre-eclampsia in detail, in this thesis, it is usually graded into mild 
and severe forms (von Dadelszen et al., 2003).  More recently certain authors have emphasized 
the gestational age at presentation, sub-dividing the condition into early- (< 34w) and late-onset 
pre-eclampsia (≥ 34w0d).  Early onset pre-eclampsia is almost always severe and being the more 
dangerous form for the mother and baby, such cases are usually referred to specialised centres 
(Hall et al., 2006; van der Merwe et al., 2010). 
 
The clinical course of women with early onset, severe pre-eclampsia may be associated with 
progressive deterioration of the maternal and fetal conditions.  Thus, because delivery is the only 
definitive way of arresting and reversing (curing) this pregnancy-associated disease, there is 
broad agreement on delivery (aggressive management – hurry up) in the presence of multi-organ 
dysfunction, fetal distress or once a gestation of 34w0d has been reached (Hall et al., 2000).  
Once pre-eclampsia has developed, delivery is always in the best interests of the mother, thus the 
beneficent doctor would always want to deliver the baby.  On the other hand, delivery at early 
gestations holds particular dangers for the baby being associated with high perinatal mortality 
and morbidity resulting from prematurity, as the most important factor for survival of a healthy 
baby is gestational age (Derham et al., 1989). At the threshold of viability, careful prolongation 
of the pregnancy (expectant management – wait), under the care of tertiary specialists, by periods 
as short as several days to a week can make a significant difference in the perinatal outcome (Hall 
et al., 2000a).  Ultimately the potential benefits for the baby must be balanced against the 
potential dangers to the mother.  Expectant management of carefully selected patients with early 
onset, severe pre-eclampsia has been shown to be safe for the mother and beneficial for the baby 
(Hall et al., 2000; Hall et al., 2000a; Hall et al., 2006).  These findings have since been replicated 
in developed countries such as France (Haddad et al., 2004) and endorsed widely (Frias & 
Belfort, 2003), yet other experts still regard the magnitude of maternal risks associated with 
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expectant management as unclear (Steegers et al., 2010) highlighting one of several areas of 
professional, moral decision making in the clinical management of pre-eclampsia. 
 
The author of this dissertation has been managing women with pre-eclampsia at a tertiary referral 
hospital for more than 25 years and has led research on the same condition for 17 years.  In 1999 
he obtained his doctorate at Stellenbosch University entitled “Expectant management of early 
onset, severe pre-eclampsia” (Hall, 1999).  With this level of exposure to the clinical 
management of pre-eclampsia I have become acutely aware of many sensitive, even vulnerable 
“areas” where ethics and clinical practice impinge on each other.   This thesis will address such 
areas in more-or-less chronological fashion, beginning with dilemmas that arise prior to 
pregnancy, then from the start to the end of pregnancy and finally, relevant issues that persist 
long after the pregnancy has passed.  The morally astute clinician will certainly benefit by being 
mentally prepared for the various ethical dilemmas that pre-eclampsia will present to him or her.  
In most cases the initial management decisions will require considered, expeditious execution - 
hurry up!  After this initial evaluation and stabilisation period, some pregnancies will need to be 
delivered (hurry up) while for others that are remote from term (term = 37-41w), and where the 
mother and fetus are stable, the more prudent course will be to offer expectant management – 
wait! 
 
1.2 A framework for ethics in clinical practice 
 
Ethics is the result of a systematic and theoretical reflection on the phenomenon of morality.  In 
terms of morality we believe that people, in this case doctors and patients, may be held 
responsible or accountable for their actions.  Such actions should be guided by moral norms and 
principles.  Humans are rational beings that can act freely by making informed choices.  This 
brings about the obligation to act in a morally correct fashion.  In ethics we are not dealing with 
factual enquiry but rather we reflect on the moral status of acts through the application of theories 
and principles to distinguish between good or bad actions.  This leads us to normative ethics that 
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provide guidelines tested for moral acceptance which in turn lead to moral choices (Hall, 2012:1).  
When this type of theoretical ethics is super-imposed on everyday life or e.g. clinical medicine 
we have “applied ethics”.  Actions may also be right or wrong in terms of the law but this does 
not mean that ethics and the law are synonymous.  There are many generally agreed actions that 
are wrong but not illegal; however, ethically correct behaviour sometimes does become 
enforceable through professional bodies such as medical councils. 
 
Ethical dilemmas occur when we have to choose between two or more compelling obligations in 
circumstances that prevent us from doing both.  Action in compliance with one obligation will 
cause contravention of the other, which leads to moral perplexity as we are forced to choose.  The 
philosopher Peter Geach denied that such conflicts occur, appealing to the providence of God, but 
in real life such conflicts certainly happen in clinical medicine (Geach, 1969:128).  When 
confronted with such ethical dilemmas we deliberate the issue and are required to provide 
justification for our considered final position while understanding that such justification is 
seldom compellingly conclusive.  In this sense we grapple with uncertainty. 
 
We examine an ethical dilemma using the illumination of the major moral theories.  A moral 
theory may be defined as “a conceptual framework in terms of which action guides or norms for 
action are formulated, as well as certain rules in terms of which those action guides are to be 
applied” (van Niekerk, 2011:19).  Moral theories are applied to moral problems or dilemmas in 
order to guide our actions.  We may justifiably ask the question: at which level of abstraction do 
the various theories operate, is there a specific hierarchy?  Utilitarianism (a form of 
consequentialism) through the account of Mill and deontology through the account of Kant have 
both been systematically elaborated and are very influential in bioethics (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2009:357).  Despite the robustness of these two best-known theories there are several 
competing theories such as virtue, communitarian, social contract and rights-based ethics that 
demand careful attention.  The fact that one particular theory is not universally accepted indicates 
that strong affiliation with any single ethical theory is precarious.  Defects and excesses appear in 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
15 
 
all the major theories and therefore knowledge of the insights and arguments within them is 
indispensible for the practice of bioethics. Beauchamp and Childress state this position as 
follows: “We accept as legitimate various aspects of many theories advanced in the history of 
ethics.  However, we reject both the hypothesis that all leading principles of the major moral 
theories can be assimilated into a coherent whole and the hypothesis that each of the theories 
offers an equally tenable moral framework” (2009:334). 
 
The field of bioethics is a wide one and certain theories may better fit certain sub-divisions 
thereof e.g. utilitarianism may be more suited to public health than clinical medical ethics.  For 
their part, Beauchamp and Childress argue that almost all of the theories accept the four 
principles upon which they base their own theory, often referred to as principlism (2009:362).  
The initial position of Beauchamp and Childress was that established ethics theories such as 
utilitarianism are the highest level of abstraction, followed by principles, then specified rules and 
finally particular moral judgements. 
   
Beauchamp and Childress drew from the work of W.D. Ross in the formulation of their own 
views (2009:15).  Ross was a “pluralist” and in the 1930’s he formulated the idea that 
“principles” are moral guidelines that arise from an intuitive sense of right and wrong actions 
(Dancy, 2002:411).  He drew a distinction between prima facie and actual obligations.  “A prima 
facie obligation is one that must be fulfilled unless it conflicts, on a particular occasion, with an 
equal or stronger obligation” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:15).  As moral agents we look at all 
sides of the issue, assessing the merits of different approaches in order to locate, what Ross called 
“the greatest balance” of right over wrong to determine our actions (Ross, 1930:19-36).  Again, it 
is important to state that when evaluating the theories that influence bioethics it is almost 
impossible to consistently and coherently defend a single moral theory.  Therefore we should 
rather seek to understand the different approaches well and then utilise ethical pluralism.  By not 
choosing one theory to the exclusion of others we are able to employ the best aspects of each 
theory. This provides our basic framework. 
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The theoretical background discussed has been further assimilated into models such as this five 
step example. 
1.  Identify the moral dilemma – what are the conflicting values? 
2. Establish all the necessary information – medical, legal, ethical, socio-political norms; 
patient preferences; practitioner’s personal value system. 
3. Analyse the information obtained. 
4. Formulate possible solutions and make recommendations or take action. 
5. Implement the necessary policies in institutions/private practice (Moodley, 2011). 
 
1.3 Obstetrics, maternal-fetal medicine and pre-eclampsia 
 
“Sound clinical reasoning and moral judgement are essential to the work of an obstetrician” as 
they are required to “make ethically complex decisions on a daily basis” (DiGiovanni, 2010).  
These unavoidable ethical debates particularly in maternal-fetal medicine are neither insoluble, 
nor a matter of personal opinion.  “In situations that seem to pit the interests of pregnant women 
against the interests of their fetuses, clinicians must be prepared to identify the key issues and 
relevant clinical aspects in cases encountered to find a solution in the mother-fetus dyad” 
(DiGiovanni, 2010).  Ethics in obstetrics and maternal-fetal medicine are unique in that the 
clinician is dealing with two “interwoven” patients who may at times have different interests.  
Unlike the general practitioner, the obstetrician may only meet the patient once she is pregnant 
and so trust must be developed quickly.  This is even harder in state institutions where the 
chances that the patient will be seen by the same doctor continuously are slim. Outside of the 
private sector and particularly in developing countries, pregnant women and neonates are 
particularly vulnerable groups that pose unique ethical dilemmas (Wilkinson et al., 2011). 
 
Ethics, professional values and behaviours are intrinsic to obstetric competency, and medical 
training institutions are now acutely aware that training in professionalism must be incorporated 
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into the curriculum.  However, due to the lack of consensus on a definition of professionalism, 
training institutions should at least provide institutional definitions (Hall, 2013).  Certain authors 
argue that “medical professionalism should reflect the values of a virtue-based ethic that stresses 
compassion and beneficence, rather than the values of a duty-based ethic” (Swick et al., 2006).  
Chervenak and others have promoted the “professional responsibility model of leadership” based 
on the concepts of John Gregory (1724-1773) and Thomas Percival (1740-1804), with a core 
component of ethical values that subordinate self-interest.  In addition professional physicians 
must be committed to intellectual excellence, and practice medicine according to exacting 
scientific standards (Chervenak et al., 2013). 
 
Van Niekerk and Benatar have pointed out that there are very few well trained bioethicists in 
South Africa with the skills and credibility to provide effective and appreciated bioethics 
consultations in the clinical care setting (van Niekerk & Benatar, 2011).  If clinicians develop an 
understanding of the critical elements of clinical medical ethics they will become more confident 
in addressing the ethical issues in clinical cases.  However, clinicians often express the view that 
the bioethics literature is too general, vague and principlist in nature.  They would prefer easily 
applied case-specific references.  Indeed Beauchamp and Childress emphasize that abstract 
principles must be further specified, adding content into case-specific guidance (2009:17).  In this 
regard the analytical and clinical arguments of philosophically and legally aware clinicians are 
enlightening in moving from hypothetical scenarios to real clinical situations.  When using 
principlism or other moral theories, we may be uncertain about which principles to apply.  If 
more than one principle applies we are urged to weigh them and apply Rawls’ idea of reflective 
equilibrium.  Thus principles need to be made specific (specified) in each case and reciprocally, 
case analysis requires illumination from principles.  However, “There is no reason to expect that 
the process of revising moral judgements and specifying and balancing principles will come to an 
end in a perfect equilibrium.  Particular moralities are, from this perspective, continuous works in 
progress rather than finished products” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:383). 
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In biomedical ethics, agreements providing clarity in precedent cases are inordinately useful but a 
literature search using the search engines Scopus, PubMed, EBSCOhost and Philosopher’s Index, 
as well as the search functions within eminent journals such as Bioethics; South African Journal 
of Philosophy; Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics; Journal of Medicine and Law; Journal of 
Applied Philosophy and others revealed scant information on “ethics AND pre-eclampsia”.  It is 
therefore the aim of this thesis to highlight specific regularly encountered problem areas and 
discuss them in a bioethics context.  By assisting clinicians with the resolution of real-life ethical 
dilemmas presented by clinical decision-making, I hope to make an original contribution to this 
field of study. 
 
1.4 Chapter overview 
The chapters that follow the introduction deal with the ethical issues involved in the clinical 
management of pre-eclampsia and related matters, before, during and after the pregnancy. Actual 
cases have been adapted for use in anonymous fashion.  Once the pertinent issues have been 
examined a “summary position” is assumed at the end of each chapter.  Full references follow the 
final chapter of the document. 
 
Chapter Two begins by unpacking the ethics of pre-conception counselling.  It unmasks the 
tension in the funder-obstetrician-patient relationship and considers the justifiable limits of 
paternalism and autonomy, demonstrating how over a relatively short period of time counselling 
has changed from a paternalistic and directive approach based on beneficence, to a non-directive 
“doctrine” resting on respect for autonomy, and currently finds itself moving on to a “shared 
responsibility” position somewhere between the first two.  Reproductive autonomy represents a 
strong individual right that includes the freedom to procreate and the freedom not to do so.  Both 
are important for individual liberty.  This subsection also deals with two perplexing questions: 
when is it morally wrong to procreate, and is there a duty not to procreate?  The potential to 
lower the incidence of pre-eclampsia by fortification of staple foods consumed even before a 
woman becomes pregnant is alluring.  Once again beneficence, paternalism and autonomy are 
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relevant but ultimately a conception of public health with a strong commitment to social justice 
provides moral direction. 
 
There is currently a concerted effort in biomedical research to construct an early screening test 
for pre-eclampsia to detect women at high risk of developing the disease. The first section of 
Chapter Three examines the ethics issues at the core of implementing such a program.  The 
differences between the better considered scenario of genetic screening e.g. Down’s syndrome, 
and screening for pre-eclampsia are elaborated, and counselling reappears in a new context.   
Impressive advances continue to be made in the treatment of fetal conditions.  These treatment 
options have promoted the concept of the fetus as a patient in perinatal medicine, but we need to 
understand the functions and applications of this concept.  The termination of a pregnancy with 
severe pre-eclampsia at <24 weeks is not uncommon in tertiary referral practice.  The moral 
considerations are explained with and without granting the previable fetus the status of 
personhood and the concept of futility is interrogated. 
 
In Chapter Four we first return to the theme of counselling in different contexts.  Most women 
are prepared to make great personal sacrifices for the welfare of their pregnancies, thus 
demonstrating supererogatory attitudes.  In addition, many do not feel unwell in the early stages 
of pre-eclampsia.  These two factors together with evidence and risk influence the counselling.  
Healthcare in South Africa is certainly challenged by resource constraints.  This raises the issue 
of justice, specifically distributive justice when considering the management of scarce, extra-
ordinary resources.  Just how expectant management of early pre-eclampsia facilitates this 
process is explained.  Pregnant women have a unique disadvantage in that they cannot be 
separated from their fetuses but expectant management of early pre-eclampsia is only offered as 
inpatient management.  Therefore, if a woman does want to approximate this benefit for her 
fetus, she must voluntarily suffer restriction of her freedom until delivery and eventual discharge 
with her baby.  This subsection will examine the premises of such a decision. 
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In Chapter Five we begin by examining the concept of maternal-fetal conflict.  Social stereotypes 
expect women to be self-sacrificing and judge women especially harshly if they exhibit behavior 
that is harmful to the fetus and future child.  The theme is continued as the concept of non-
compliance is expounded and the reasons for behaviors that are often categorized as such, are 
explored.  In the final section of this chapter, a case is used to illustrate maternal-fetal conflict 
and non-compliance, in the context of competent maternal refusal of delivery by medically 
indicated caesarean section. 
 
I begin Chapter Six by providing succinct data on survival and neurocognitive outcomes of 
babies born at or just beyond the threshold of viability.  Next I draw together generic elements of 
counselling discussed in earlier chapters and integrate them into four options described in the 
literature to prepare for the “high stakes” discussion on the resuscitation of extremely premature, 
new-born babies.  Considering resuscitation will lead us to consider the moral relevance of the 
distinction between withholding and withdrawing care. Some of the babies born to mothers with 
early pre-eclampsia will survive with neurocognitive and/or other impairments.  In the final 
section I discuss the perils of expecting a perfect baby and the relationship between society and 
disabled persons. 
 
The practice of obstetrics involves different types of care.  In Chapter Seven the focus falls on the 
palliative and comfort care of the pregnant woman.  When a woman who has suffered major 
complications of pre-eclampsia before delivery is subsequently declared brain dead, her doctors 
and family are faced with challenging medical and ethical decisions regarding the living fetus. 
 
Anti-hypertensive agents are essential to control maternal blood pressure in the acute or expectant 
phase of pre-eclampsia management, but the choices are very limited.  Chapter Eight highlights 
the lack of clinical research amongst pregnant women as the main cause of this problem.  The 
reasons behind the reticence for inclusion, and the ethical principles justifying greater 
participation in biomedical studies are explored. 
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In Chapter Nine we discover that pre-eclampsia has lifelong implications for the mother and her 
infant.  The particular danger is the development of cardiovascular disease in later life.  This 
leads us to consider the obligation of preventive care and the ethics principles invoked by this 
approach. 
Finally, in Chapter Ten, some future frontiers for pre-eclampsia are identified. 
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CHAPTER TWO: POWER AND THE PRE-CONCEPTION PERIOD 
 
2.1 Pre-conception counselling 
 
Counselling is a theme that will permeate this thesis, resurfacing on many occasions, but each 
time in a different clinical context.  This section begins with a case which proceeded (as far as is 
known) without the benefit of pre-conception counselling. 
 
Case 1: A 37-year-old, mother of three children booked late for antenatal care. In her 
previous pregnancy she developed early, severe pre-eclampsia that was complicated 
by haemolysis, elevated liver enzymes and low platelets (HELLP) syndrome.  She was 
delivered at 32 weeks’ gestation but developed renal failure during the post-partum 
period and was managed in an Obstetric Critical Care unit.  In the next pregnancy 
she developed gestational hypertension at 24 weeks’ gestation and was referred to a 
level 2 (specialist care) hospital but defaulted care.  At 33 weeks’ gestation she 
presented to the emergency area of a community-level institution with acute, severe 
pre-eclampsia. Shortly after admission, and before she could be transferred to a 
higher level of care, she developed pulmonary oedema (heart failure) and collapsed.  
Resuscitation was performed immediately but was unsuccessful.  A post mortem 
examination revealed failure of five maternal organ systems. 
 
All women who have developed pre-eclampsia should be counselled about the risks for 
recurrence of the condition in a subsequent pregnancy before discharge from the hospital, after 
completion of the pregnancy.  “Patients want necessary medical information and honest 
assessments of what to expect with clear acknowledgement of uncertainties” (DiGiovanni, 2010).  
Ideally, women who have previously experienced early, severe pre-eclampsia and who are 
considering another pregnancy should present to a specialist or maternal-fetal sub-specialist for 
counselling on rates of recurrence.  The doctor must take into account that because pre-eclampsia 
is a heterogeneous disorder, the pathogenesis can differ in women with various risk factors. In the 
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case presented the risk of recurrence of any form of pre-eclampsia was approximately 65% and 
21% for early severe pre-eclampsia (Barton & Sibai, 2008).  If a woman with previous pre-
eclampsia decides to proceed with a pregnancy after counselling, she should proceed in the safest 
manner possible.  There are several modifiable risks factors such as inter-pregnancy interval, diet, 
body mass index, smoking, immune competence if HIV positive and exposure to seminal 
antigens that can all decrease the chances of recurrence (Hall, 2007; Barton & Sibai 2008; 
Shachar & Lyell, 2012). Discussing matters of sexual activity, when to fall pregnant, obesity, 
HIV status and social drug habits need to be approached sensitively.  Once pregnant other 
interventions will be considered from as early as the first trimester and a higher level of 
surveillance will be applied.  In the case above, no mention was made of pre-conception 
counselling.  That woman had experienced severe complications of pre-eclampsia, first hand and 
had three living children.  We can only speculate as to why she proceeded with another 
pregnancy that cost her life. 
 
When couples do present for pre-conception counselling, on what principles should such 
counselling proceed?  This sub-section on the ethics of pre-conception counselling will 
demonstrate how over a relatively short period of time counselling has changed from a 
paternalistic and directive approach based on beneficence, to a non-directive “doctrine” resting 
on (some would say intimidated by) respect for autonomy which is a fundamental value in 
bioethics.  Baily summarises the position saying that indeed “The birth of bioethics as a field was 
closely associated with a conceptual and practical shift away from paternalism and towards 
respect for patient autonomy as the core value in the physician-patient relationship” (2011).  
Counselling of the patients currently finds itself moving back to a flexible position of shared 
responsibility (patient and doctor) somewhere between these two positions. 
 
Power in the funder-obstetrician-patient relationship 
By virtue of their position, doctors exercise power through their ability to take and implement 
decisions directly or through others.  The political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) is 
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well known for advocating the constraint of power through a social contract.  Exploring this 
familiar tension within the above-mentioned relationship will lead us to consider the justifiable 
limits of paternalism and autonomy.  Although it is sometimes hidden, the field of clinical 
medicine, both public and private is a contested area when viewed in the socio-political context.  
In order to counteract a monopoly of power, Chervenak et al., advocate a professional leadership 
model that proposes constraints on organisational and individual power (2013).  But, even if 
monopolies are addressed, asymmetrical power relationships are certainly present.  The battle for 
dominance between doctors, patients, public and private healthcare funders is not always clearly 
perceived and shifts in power occur regularly over time. 
 
A short summary of the asymmetrical power relationships is appropriate in order to understand 
who is involved, how the power relationships are made manifest and the consequences thereof.  
The power has generally resided in the hands of the doctors who provide the service upon which 
the public depends.  The state (as the public healthcare funder) and private healthcare funders, as 
genuine and proxy employers have an agenda to wrest this authority back from medical 
professionals.  A form of organisational exploitation (power) currently occurs in both the public 
and private sectors where unfunded mandates are issued to doctors or clinical services for quality 
improvement or patient satisfaction (Chervenak et al., 2013).  
 
Until recently doctors practiced a patriarchal form of medicine but recently the autonomy of the 
patient as a medical consumer has gained much ground and patients (in obstetrics women) are 
gaining power.  However, in an ironic full circle, this shift in power sometimes suits certain 
doctors by enabling them to maintain the power they seek, but how can this be? 
 
Using deliberative clinical ethical judgement it is not consistent with beneficence-based 
obligations, for doctors to offer therapy or interventions in the absence of evidence of improved 
outcomes (Wielgos, et al., 2013). Caesarean section is a method of delivery for the mother and 
baby.  The onset of spontaneous labour and natural birth is a painful process that lasts for many 
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hours and may begin or end at any time of the day.  Elective caesarean section can be 
conveniently scheduled, is completed in less than one hour and is performed under full analgesia 
with post-operative analgesia provided.  Traditionally caesarean section has only been performed 
when there is a medical indication to do so.  However with the strong emergence of patients’ 
autonomy and the right to make an informed choice, certain women are “demanding” (“caesarean 
on demand”) delivery by caesarean section without a medical indication.  Thus in the case of 
caesarean section the power is perceived to have shifted from the doctor to the patient, but what 
many fail to see is that this is exactly what many doctors want other parties to believe.  In actual 
fact this maintains the power of the doctors who understandably prefer shorter, predictable 
deliveries to uncertain drawn out affairs in the middle of the night.  The issue of the physician’s 
or patient’s power will surface again in other sections of the thesis. 
 
Having explored the familiar tension of power in the funder-obstetrician-patient relationship 
leads us to consider the justifiable limits of paternalism and autonomy.  In fact, paternalism may 
be an “unfortunate” term.  One may ask “how far should a feminist obstetrician go in imposing 
opinions or treatment on women in the name of their own best interest and/or that of the fetus” 
(Dickenson, 2002:4). 
 
Paternalism and conflicts between beneficence and autonomy 
According to Beauchamp and Childress “beneficence provides the primary goal and rationale of 
medicine” (2009:207).  Physicians have a long history of using their own judgements to 
determine their patient’s needs for information and treatment, but in the current era, autonomy 
rights of patients have set limits on “beneficent” actions by doctors, thereby raising the problem 
of paternalism.  As a father acts beneficently in deciding what is best for his children, the analogy 
is that the professional doctor with his knowledge and training can best decide on his patient’s 
interests.  The normatively neutral definition of paternalism chosen by Beauchamp and Childress 
is “the intentional overriding of one person’s preferences or actions by another person, where the 
person who overrides justifies this action by appeal to the goal of benefitting or preventing or 
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mitigating harm to the person whose preferences or actions are overridden” (2009:208).  
Paternalism challenges doctors especially when e.g. a patient makes an informed choice to pursue 
a harmful course of action e.g. not to undergo a caesarean section for fetal distress (see Chapter 
5).  So Beauchamp and Childress argue that “beneficence sometimes provides grounds for 
justifiably restricting substantially autonomous actions” (2009:209).  On occasion limited 
rationality restricts the capacity of a person to act autonomously and we are justified in arranging 
their choice to correct for cognitive biases.  This is “soft” paternalism e.g. discouraging the action 
of smoking, but if we manipulate persons into doing what is good for them e.g. taxing cigarettes 
we practice “hard” paternalism. Soft paternalism involves less conflict between autonomy and 
beneficence but in hard paternalism the informed beneficiary defines her own best interests by 
different values.  I will return to beneficence and non-maleficence in clinical judgement and 
counselling after discussing respect for patient autonomy.  Soft paternalism appears again in the 
final sub-section of this chapter.  In pre-conception counselling paternalism can be justified by 
two positions: 
 Paternalism justified by consent or prospective benefit. Here we deal with hypothetical 
consent which implies that persons would accept beneficent paternalism when 
psychological pressures lead them to take unreasonably risky actions.  Regarding benefit, 
major benefit with minor infringement of autonomy would be acceptable, but not vice 
versa. 
 Justified hard paternalism.  Minor hard paternalism is common in hospitals according to 
Beauchamp and Childress, but to be justified it needs to satisfy certain conditions: 
significant but preventable harm; action will probably prevent harm; benefits outweigh 
risks; action is the least autonomy-restrictive alternative and, no substantial autonomy 
interest is compromised.  As the risk to a patient’s welfare increases the likelihood of a 
justified paternalistic intervention increases, so a doctor must balance her beneficence 
with the patient’s autonomy. However hard paternalism in professional practice is risky as 
it disrespects personal autonomy and invites abuse (Beauchamp and Childress, 
2009:216,233).  
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One de novo factor that increases the risk of pre-eclampsia is the use of assisted reproduction 
techniques.  It has already been stated that the aetiology of pre-eclampsia is multi-factorial and 
that one of the pathophysiologic pathways functions through immune maladaptation to paternal 
antigens.  Short (< six months) exposure to new seminal antigens (sperm and secretions) has been 
shown to increase the risk of pre-eclampsia (Verwoerd et al., 2002).  Sperm or ovum donation 
used in assisted reproduction increase the risks through the same pathways, while multiple 
pregnancies that frequently result from assisted reproduction are also at increased risk of pre-
eclampsia through hyperplacentation (Barton & Sibai, 2008).  In a thought provoking 
publication, Gillian Lockwood, a philosophically trained director of an infertility unit in Oxford, 
has discussed the following case (Lockwood, 1999). 
 
Case 2: A 34-year-old women was referred for in vitro fertilisation (IVF). Both her 
first and second pregnancies were complicated by early pre-eclampsia and ended in 
early neonatal deaths due to extreme prematurity. She had been born with only one 
poorly developed kidney and accepted sterilisation after the second pregnancy. She 
subsequently suffered end-stage renal failure but after dialysis and a renal 
transplant, returned to good health.  She maintained good kidney function on a 
combination of immune-suppressive drugs, steroids and anti-hypertensive agents that 
are not absolutely contraindicated in pregnancy.  She was “so distressed by her 
childlessness” that she underwent a reversal of the tubal ligation but failed to 
conceive due to blocked tubes.  The IVF was successful, resulting in a twin 
conception.  At 20 weeks’ gestation she developed deep vein thrombosis.  Her twins 
were born at 29 weeks and survived. 
 
This woman received full pre-conception counselling, chose autonomously to fall pregnant 
despite significant risks for herself and the fetuses, was managed at a high level of care and had a 
complicated but successful outcome.  The decision to accept the couple onto the IVF programme 
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required balancing the risks (already explained) and safety, but the ethical aspects were 
contentious.  Great emphasis was laid on obtaining true informed consent.  However in the 
tertiary referral clinic of the author of this dissertation, many women with similar high-risk 
backgrounds fall pregnant, spontaneously and intentionally without counselling but knowing the 
risks.  Should the IVF clinic have declined to help the couple in Case 2?  The risks involved were 
significant and may even have resulted in early death due to complicated pre-eclampsia or 
deterioration/rejection of the renal transplant.  Lockwood argued that “as long as the risks 
associated with fertility treatment and pregnancy were thoroughly explained to, and accepted by, 
the woman (and her partner), then to refuse treatment on the sole ground that her health may 
deteriorate was unacceptably paternalistic” (1999).   I agree with this position and support the 
moral right of this couple to proceed with a pregnancy.  There were certainly risks involved for 
the mother and fetus/child but there was also the potential for a fulfilling result as demonstrated 
by the outcome.  Ultimately autonomy and safety need to be balanced.  Both the patient and her 
partner fully understood and accepted the risk-benefit equation and in this scenario the couple 
were not denying others the use of scarce resources.  The shared decision making avoided 
paternalism as the physicians did not prescribe how this woman should utilise the health benefits 
she already enjoyed as a renal transplant patient.  I also consider their approach to be more 
responsible to themselves, their pregnancy and society than that of couples who simply present 
for care already some way into a very high risk pregnancy having bypassed pre-conception 
counselling and interventions to ameliorate risks, as well as the benefits of care during early 
gestation. 
 
Maternal-fetal sub-specialists are acutely aware that the desire to bear a child is often still very 
strong, perhaps irrationally so, in women with severe, chronic diseases or reduced life-
expectancies.  “The desire to achieve the normality of pregnancy and motherhood, if only for a 
short while, can be overwhelming and must be recognised and treated sympathetically by 
physicians working in this field” (Lockwood, 1999).  
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Respect for autonomy 
Recently in bioethics, autonomy or self-rule has received inordinate emphasis, but autonomy 
itself is multi-faceted and some facets can even become rather “dangerous”.  The current 
dominance of autonomy over the much older principles of beneficence and non-maleficence is 
largely the result of recent abuses of power by physicians e.g. Nazi experiments, the Tuskegee 
syphilis trial and the Steve Biko debacle.  Space limits long quotes, but it is Isaiah Berlin who has 
most eloquently expounded the essence of autonomy in his famous passage that contains negative 
and positive conceptions of freedom (Young, 2012).  Using negative and positive obligations, 
respect for autonomy supports specific moral rules: a) tell the truth, b) respect the privacy of 
others, c) protect confidential information, d) obtain consent for interventions with patients, e) 
when asked, help others make important decisions (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:104).  Two 
other eminent philosophers have influenced autonomy; Kant insists that persons should always be 
treated as “ends”, and J.S. Mill states that power may only be exercised over persons against their 
will, to prevent harm to others (Rachels & Rachels, 2010:137; Mill, 1997).  Kant’s interpretation 
of justice requires us to respect the rights of all persons regardless of their situation because as 
reasoning human beings they are worthy of respect.  This categorical imperative , where acting  
morally requires acting out of duty, overrides considerations of utility or even virtue (Sandel, 
2009: 123).  However, as has been previously been stated, Beauchamp & Childress believe that 
respect for autonomy should be regarded as prima facie rather than absolute, as it may be 
justifiably overridden on occasion by an equal or stronger rule or principle. 
 
In essence, full autonomy is the right of every individual to make decisions for herself.  A person 
is autonomous when she chooses intentionally, with understanding and without controlling 
influences.  While the first criterion is definite, the second and third are incomplete. The 
obstetrician might not want the woman to become pregnant, or a husband might strongly desire 
another pregnancy from his wife irrespective of the risk to her health.  Furthermore, respect for 
autonomy creates important obligations for counselling that are very similar to those functioning 
for informed consent.  Patients have a fundamental right, but not a mandatory duty to choose.  
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Patients “have the right to accept or decline information. Forced information and forced choice 
are inconsistent with this obligation” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:107).  Valid informed 
consent contains the following elements that are also important to keep in mind when 
counselling:  
A. Threshold elements  
- Competence to decide and understand 
- Voluntariness in deciding 
B. Information elements 
- Disclosure of information 
-  Recommendation of a plan 
- Understanding of information and plan 
C. Consent elements 
- Decision against or in favour of plan 
- Authorisation of plan (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:120-121). 
 
I will make brief comments on each element. 
Competence.  The criteria for autonomy and competence are very similar.  Patients are competent 
to make a decision if “they have the capacity to understand the material information, to make a 
judgement about this information in the light of their values, to intend a certain outcome, and to 
communicate freely their wishes” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:113).  Certain authors propose 
different standards or levels of competence (the sliding-scale strategy) e.g. a higher level is 
required to refuse treatment.  However Beauchamp & Childress believe that it is “confusing to 
blend a decision’s complexity with the risk at stake” and recommend “placing only the required 
standards of evidence for determining decision-making competence on a sliding scale” 
(2009:117). 
 
Voluntariness.  This element removes coercion, including informational manipulation and  
rewards. It takes the right of refusal seriously. 
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Disclosure.  Physicians are obliged to disclose relevant information but in recent times the focus 
has shifted from the physician’s obligation to disclose information to the quality of the patient’s 
understanding according to Beauchamp and Childress (2009:117-118). According to Chervenak 
and McCullough the general rule for clinical practice is for the physician to disclose the major 
factors of the reasoning process, with neither medical law nor medical ethics requiring the patient 
to be provided with a complete medical education (Chervenak & McCullough, 2009). Three 
named standards are proposed to govern the norms of disclosure of information. 
 The professional practice standard.  This is determined by the professional community’s 
custom. Difficulties here include the questionable existence of a standard for each 
situation, the awareness of that standard by the doctor and the skill to serve the patient’s 
best interests.  Perhaps damningly, Beauchamp and Childress state that this standard 
“subverts the right of autonomous choice” of the patient (2009:122). 
 The reasonable person standard.  This self-explanatory standard has conceptual and 
practical difficulties.  Interestingly, there is research to indicate that “patients generally 
make their decisions prior to, and independent of the process of receiving information” 
(Faden & Beauchamp, 1980:313-336). 
 The subjective standard.  Information is adequate insofar as it meets the specific 
informational needs of the individual and for this reason it is the preferred moral 
standard of disclosure. 
 
“The ethical principles of autonomy would suggest that patients should always be fully informed 
but sometimes information can increase the cognitive and emotional burden.  The right to 
autonomy must therefore be balanced with the ethical obligation to do good (beneficence) and 
not to harm (non-maleficence) (Epstein et al., 2010).  “Beneficence-based clinical judgement 
makes an important claim: to interpret reliably the health related interests of the patient from 
medicine’s perspective.  This perspective is provided by accumulated scientific research, clinical 
experience and reasoned responses to uncertainty.” (Chervenak & McCullough, 2009).  
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Rigorous, evidence-based judgements move beyond an individual clinician’s clinical perspective, 
justifying a move away from pure non-directive counselling.  On the other hand, non-maleficence 
“should be incorporated when the physician approaches the limits of beneficence-based clinical 
judgement, that is, when the evidence for expected clinical benefit diminishes and the risks of 
clinical harm increase” (Chervenak & McCullough, 2009).  Here the cautious physician should 
be non-directive. 
 
In pre-conception counselling, non-disclosure would be restricted to “therapeutic privilege” 
where a doctor may legitimately withhold information if, based on sound judgement, such 
information would harm an unstable patient.  Counsellors should consider how information will 
enhance or reduce patient’s autonomy and judge how much they can reasonably assimilate.  
Counsellors should certainly concentrate on providing beneficial information as simply dumping 
large amounts of information may undermine the ability to choose wisely. 
 
Recommendation.  Recommending a plan on the basis of the information and shared 
responsibility is particularly important in pre-conception counselling, but more than one session 
may be necessary. 
 
Understanding.  This may be impeded by immaturity or irrationality, as well as poor 
communication skills and information overload.  Patients exhibit wide variations in 
understanding but Beauchamp and Childress state that “understanding need not be complete” 
because a grasp of the relevant, central facts is generally sufficient (2009:127).  
 
Decision and authorisation.  Sometimes patients decide against a medical plan because of a false 
belief e.g. a woman with early, severe pre-eclampsia may not feel sick and therefore decline 
hospitalisation.  According to Beauchamp and Childress “as long as this patient continues to hold 
a false belief that is material to her decision, her refusal is not an informed refusal” (2009:131).   
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Autonomy has stood accused that it is informed by liberal individualism that disregards the role 
of culture, family and community, particularly in the African context (Hellsten, 2001). Within 
communitarian societies the contribution of the family and community has greater influence on 
the decision or choices of a patient.  This has been termed “a different view on autonomy” and a 
“different perception of illness” (van Bogaert, 2006).  Here the response is that no one is “truly” 
autonomous.  Rather autonomy results from a process of formative interactions and the 
principle’s “precise demands remain unsettled and open to interpretation and specification” 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:140).  A person may even decide autonomously to surrender 
their autonomy to a third party. 
 
An important criticism of autonomy in terms of pre-conception counselling is that it leads 
counsellors to adopt a “non-directive” stance.  This is appropriate if the data on a particular 
clinical issue are equivocal e.g. when the benefits of early screening for pre-eclampsia are 
unclear.  However, this “doctrine” of non-directiveness is now under challenge particularly when 
robust, evidence-based medicine provides clear answers.  Professional counselling entails 
showing respect to the patient and enhancing her autonomy.  “Providing neutral information may 
fulfil the formal requirements of informed consent; nevertheless this does not encompass all of 
what respecting patients as persons entails” (Quill & Brody, 1996).  In a relationship centred 
model of autonomy, information need not always be provided in a neutral fashion to enhance 
that autonomy.  When the evidence of benefit is strong, the facts must be stated clearly by the 
doctor using a in a respectful, deliberative yet directive approach.  In this manner power and 
responsibility are shared by the patient and her doctor.   
 
2.2 The decision to fall pregnant 
   
The moral duty or obligation not to fall pregnant, if it exists at all, is usually raised in the context 
of severely debilitating genetic (inherited) diseases such as Huntington’s disease.  However I 
want to shift the focus of the question to the context where a woman has an extremely high 
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chance of developing pre-eclampsia with its severely debilitating complications such as renal 
failure, cerebral haemorrhage or even death.  When examining Cases 1&2 several difficult 
questions arise. 
 In the light of the likely severe complications, was it in these patient’s best interests to fall 
pregnant? 
 Did they neglect their duties to their husbands/partners, surviving children, and relatives? 
 Should doctors make judgements about a woman’s capacity to parent?  A mother with a 
chronic debilitating disease e.g. renal failure after pre-eclampsia or with a shortened life 
expectancy may perform less well as a parent.  Infertility legislation in the United 
Kingdom places great emphasis on the “interests of the child” who may be born through 
assisted reproduction (Lockwood, 2002:165). 
  Infertility services are a scarce resource.  In Case 2, how do we balance autonomy, justice 
and utility? 
 
In addressing the issues we will first interrogate reproductive autonomy, and then consider 
freedom to procreate and freedom not to procreate.  Thereafter we will discuss the related 
questions of “when is it morally wrong to procreate?” and “is there a duty not to procreate”? 
 
Reproductive autonomy 
Reproductive autonomy represents the strong interest or right to make choices regarding 
reproduction even when others might regard such choices as unwise or against public interest.  
Ronald Dworkin, an American philosopher and legal theorist describes the reproductive 
autonomy of persons as “a right to control their own role in procreation unless the state has a 
compelling reason for denying them that control” (1993:148).  However we live in a world where 
medical information is increasingly available and where society is “policed” by those who 
advocate responsible motherhood according to the British medical lawyer Jean McHale (2002: 
101-112).  Thus society may become increasingly critical of those who, in its opinion make the 
wrong reproductive decisions although this does not in itself make the decisions immoral.  
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Freedom to procreate 
What makes the freedom to procreate valuable, or put another way, why do individuals value 
having genetically related children through ordinary (natural procreation) so highly?  Carson 
Strong provides five reasons to answer this question (2002:19-20).  
 First, he rejects the notion that men need to prove their virility and that women must bear 
children to prove their femininity.  Although such views have apparently been held in 
certain cultures, Strong finds these stereotypic roles selfish, confused and indefensible 
(2002:19).  Rather than looking at descriptive reasons given, we should concentrate on the 
normative question of reasons given to justify the desire for genetic offspring. 
 Second, we may value having genetically related children because it involves 
participation in the mystery of the creation of a self-conscious person like ourselves. 
 Third, genetically related children might affirm a couple’s love and acceptance of each 
other. 
 Next, through procreation we provide a link to future persons and make a personal 
contribution to the future human community. 
 Finally, the experiences of pregnancy and childbirth are regarded as deeply meaningful 
and valuable in themselves.  Pregnant women are esteemed by the community while 
pregnancy provides an experience of personal development and an opportunity for 
altruism for many.  Then, there is the joy experienced at the birth of a baby. 
Strong believes that these reasons can be used to defend the desire for genetic offspring and 
suggests that procreation can contribute to both self-fulfilment and self-identity (2002:21).  It 
follows therefore that interference with these rights may deny the necessary respect due to 
individuals.  However “this does not mean that freedom to procreate is never outweighed by 
other ethical concerns” (Strong, 2002:21).  It means that we would require compelling reasons to 
override reproductive autonomy.  Women themselves may be torn between their emphases on 
concrete caring relationships characterised as feminist “ethics of care”, while on the other hand 
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desiring to exercise individual rights to satisfy the sometimes overwhelming desire for 
motherhood (Hall et al., 2013).  
 
Freedom not to procreate 
As in the section above, I will answer the question of why freedom not to procreate carries value.  
Each of these points is closely linked to the one that follows. 
 This “negative” freedom (not to procreate) helps a person direct the course of her life.  
Having children places major demands on the parent’s lives in terms of time and all 
resources.  Autonomy and self-determination are enhanced by the freedom to decide 
whether or when to have a child.  The same freedom is needed when considering 
additional children.  I regularly see women in my tertiary referral obstetric clinic who 
have an underlying medical disease such as diabetes mellitus or permanent organ 
impairment such as partial renal failure following pregnancy-associated diseases like pre-
eclampsia.  When a subsequent pregnancy would significantly threaten the existing 
health, or even life of a woman, the freedom not to procreate is important.  Sadly, in my 
experience, many husbands (partners) are willing and sometimes even encourage their 
wives (partners) to take this risk.  The freedom not to procreate is particularly important 
for women in order to direct the course of their lives. 
 Freedom not to procreate is closely linked to bodily self-determination.  Women have the 
right to decide on the use of contraceptives and especially sterilisation.  Although men 
also have this right, it is especially important for women due to their previous 
“oppression” and the fact that they directly bear the burdens of pregnancy (Hall et al., 
2013). 
 The next reason has already been alluded to in the previous points and is articulated by 
many feminist authors.  These writers postulate that male-stream moral theory has both 
feminised and looked down upon the role of care and relationship in moral decision-
making.  Carol Gilligan juxtaposes ‘care ethics’ with what she calls ‘justice or rights 
ethics’ and sees them as loosely feminine and masculine respectively (1997:146-152).  
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Joy Kroeger-Mappes argues that a single system consisting of two ethics, with one 
presiding over the other (rights over care ethics), is seriously flawed when viewed from 
women’s perspective, as women but not men, are held accountable to both ethics. 
(1994:108-131).  Women are held to the requirements of the care ethic, especially as it 
pertains to the home and family life, in ways that men are not. For example, if one’s child 
is ill, feminised care and relationship ethics and responsibilities imply that the mother but 
often not the father is morally obligated to stay at home and look after the child rather 
than to go to work (Hall et al., 2013: 29-33). Thus the current system that subordinates 
women according to Kroeger-Mappes, treats the same caring activities as obligatory for 
women and as supererogatory for most men (1994:108-131).  This is why freedom not to 
procreate is especially important for women. 
 
When is it morally wrong to procreate? 
“The idea that it might be a moral crime to have a baby, that it might be wrong to bring a new 
human individual into the world is to many people simply bizarre.  Having a baby is a wonderful 
thing to do, it is usually regarded as the unproblematic choice from the moral if not from the 
social or medical point of view.  It is only having an abortion and perhaps also refraining from 
having children that is regarded as requiring justification” (Harris, 1998:99). 
 
At the heart of this debate lies the question of whether a child could be better off if he or she had 
never been born, known in legal terms as “wrongful life”.  This term is usually made in reference 
to being born impaired rather than unimpaired, existing and not existing (Bennett & Harris, 
2002:322), but in the pre-eclampsia scenario the additional issues here are the unintended but 
foreseen consequences of an extremely high-risk pregnancy. 
 
The question that I want to ask is, is it morally wrong to deliberately proceed with a pregnancy 
when the baby might survive disabled (due to being born extremely preterm), or if the baby 
survives intact, where the mother dies shortly after labour, or perhaps a few years later?  In other 
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words, when a mother (and father) have fair warning of these dangers through pre-conception 
counselling, is it morally right or wrong to proceed with such a pregnancy spontaneously or even 
request fertility treatment to become pregnant?  I contend that when all of the parties with an 
interest in the pregnancy (the parents, the potential child, family and society) have received due 
consideration, it is not wrong to proceed responsibly.  The answer must also depend on the value 
that we place on life itself and what we regard as a worthwhile life.  We generally regard life as 
valuable and positive but a fully autonomous couple would have to carefully consider the positive 
and negative predicted scenarios after the pregnancy (e.g. an impaired child; children without a 
mother; a husband with a chronically impaired wife or a maternal death). 
 
In terms of the baby that might lose its mother in childbirth, the argument comparing existence 
with non-existence is problematic.  If a person was never born, never was, then it is illogical to 
contend that they could be said to be better or worse off (Steinbock, 1992:117).  On the other 
hand it seems reasonable to consider lives that are worth living and “those that are so blighted by 
suffering that they may be considered ‘unworthwhile’” (Bennett & Harris, 2002:323).   A 
utilitarian could argue that it would be cruel to intentionally create suffering, thereby increasing 
unhappiness, but how would society prevent such pregnancies without invading individual 
privacy, bodily integrity and civil liberties? 
 
I find Bennett and Harris’s arguments enlightening and persuasive.  They defend reproductive 
autonomy and the “powerful interest or right in the freedom to make reproductive choices, even 
where these choices may be thought unwise, frivolous or contrary to the public interest” 
(2002:332).  Both agree that as long as a life is worthwhile, i.e. valued by the person whose life it 
is, it is equal to any other life regardless of its quality.  This applies to all actual lives but Bennett 
extends it to all possible lives.  Both authors agree that only a life of overwhelming suffering has 
a different value (2002:331).  Very few lives reach this “standard of awfulness”. 
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Is there a duty not to procreate? 
Having considered when it might be morally wrong to procreate, I will briefly discuss the 
opinions of Jean McHale, a British medical lawyer on whether a duty not to reproduce exists.  
There is increasing pressure in modern society on pregnant women to behave responsibly and 
make correct reproductive choices, but how far does this argument extend down the “slippery 
slope”?  Is it limited to choosing to avert significant handicap in a child, or does it include 
maternal safety as well?  McHale points out that assisted reproductive technologies already 
provide a means of controlling access to reproductive services and that clinicians act as 
gatekeepers according to pre-determined criteria (2002:101).  However such control does not 
apply outside the walls of infertility clinics and a general application would at present seem 
“ludicrous”.  We may ask who should bear the costs of caring for chronically ill mothers or 
affected children.  For indigent parents the cost may have to be carried by the state but does this 
equate to imposing a duty not to procreate?  Some are concerned about modern society’s attitude 
towards vulnerable community members.   
 
In the introductory paragraph of section 2.2 I asked whether a moral duty not to fall pregnant 
exists when a woman has an extremely high chance of developing complicated pre-eclampsia as 
reflected by clinical Cases 1&2.  I have argued that reproductive autonomy is a fundamental 
human right that must be respected.  Procreation allows humans to participate in the valuable 
process of creating self-conscious persons that link us to the future.  Properly informed parents 
are best able to determine their own best interests.  Almost all forms of human life carry value 
and it is very difficult to predict with certainty (when judged by the person whose life it is), those 
that will not be worthwhile.  I am therefore sceptical about whether a person could ever “ever be 
regarded as being under a duty not to reproduce” and as McHale has pointed out, if such a duty 
existed, it could not be legally enforced (2002:101). 
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2.3 Fortification of foods to prevent pre-eclampsia  
 
Background 
Pre-eclampsia is a leading cause of maternal and perinatal mortality and morbidity globally but 
developing countries and vulnerable populations in developed countries are affected most (WHO, 
1998; Sibai et al., 2005; de Graaf et al., 2013).  I have already alluded to the fact that pre-
eclampsia has multi-factorial aetiology.  In 1980 Belizan and Villar observed that Mayan Indians 
in Guatemala who soaked their corn in lime before cooking had a low incidence of pre-eclampsia 
and eclampsia (1980).  The link between poverty and pre-eclampsia may therefore lie in dietary 
calcium deficiency.  Subsequently, studies linking pre-eclampsia to calcium deficiency have been 
summarised in a systematic review.  Calcium supplementation of at least one gram/day beginning 
around mid-pregnancy was associated with a modest reduction of pre-eclampsia among women 
at increased risk or with low dietary calcium intake (Hofmeyr et al., 2010).  It is believed that 
calcium supplementation in the second half of pregnancy may decrease blood pressure without 
directly addressing the underlying pathology.  Thus calcium supplementation provided before 
pregnancy might be a more effective strategy.  At the present time, a team of international 
research obstetricians, including myself, are conducting a large, powered, multi-centre 
randomised controlled trial to investigate whether low dose, pre-conceptual calcium will lower 
the rate of pre-eclampsia.  Historically, some of the most effective public health interventions 
have been achieved through the fortification of food e.g. iodine and fluoride.  If the results of this 
study are positive they could inform the decision on whether to fortify basic foods with calcium, 
but what are the ethics issues?  
 
The principle of beneficence requires us to take positive actions to contribute to the welfare of 
persons, something more demanding than non-maleficence.  For Beauchamp and Childress 
beneficence includes the virtue of benevolence, and utility in the form of balancing benefits and 
risks.  This utility is constrained by justice and differs from classic utilitarianism.  In their view 
classic utilitarianism “is systematically arranged on a principle of beneficence” but they 
consistently reject any “sole principle” for ethics, neither does beneficence override their other 
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three principles (2009:197-8). Although the fortification of basic foodstuffs may be seen to 
diminish the autonomy of indigent persons who cannot afford to buy non-fortified (usually more 
expensive) products, the previous, tested, effective public health intervention examples lead one 
to believe that an intervention of this nature would be accepted by the community.  The argument 
is further enhanced when one considers that the benefits would extend beyond pregnancy (see 
Chapter Nine). 
 
Obligatory and ideal beneficence 
Medical practice has an ancient history of embracing beneficence.  While discussing paternalism 
in section 2.1, I pointed out that beneficence can provide grounds for justifiably restricting 
autonomy.  However, to protect persons from harm caused by conditions beyond their control, 
i.e. beyond an autonomous decision, is not controversial.  The principle of beneficence supports 
certain moral rules of obligation such as: prevent or remove harm e.g. prevent pre-eclampsia  
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009: 168-9).  Beneficence requires both positive motives and actions, 
although the line between obligatory and ideal is often unclear.  According to Beauchamp and 
Childress “we are obligated to act non-maleficently toward all persons at all times, but it is 
generally not possible to act beneficently toward all persons” at all times e.g. outside of special 
relationships (2009:199).  This is too demanding!  If beneficence was an absolute ideal there 
would be no need to distinguish between obligatory and supererogatory acts.  General obligations 
are stronger when an action is necessary to prevent significant loss, with such action having a 
high chance of success without significant risks or harms to the person acting. 
Public health ethics 
The relatively new domain of public health ethics has strong utilitarian roots and assumes a 
population rather than an individual focus.   Here civil liberties and individual autonomy may 
bow to utilitarian, paternalistic and communitarian orientations (Callaghan & Jennings, 2002).  
Powers and Faden have argued that it is social justice that provides the moral foundation for 
public health ethics (2006).  The difficulty is to balance what is best for the population with 
individual protection.  Although soft or hard paternalism is sometimes justified in health care and 
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policies, caution must always be exercised.  Even soft paternalistic health care policies are 
susceptible to abuse if they lack scientific and public scrutiny, while there is always the “slippery 
slope” argument to consider.  A positive result from the research trial on pre-conception calcium 
supplementation (mentioned above), will provide robust scientific evidence for the formulation of 
public health policy.  The traditional field of public health includes the activities of water 
sanitation, disease surveillance and health education, including interventions to promote health 
and prevent disease (Dawson & Verweij, 2007).  Other fortification projects such as those with 
iodine and fluoride have already been successfully implemented in the past and as I have shown 
the ethical dilemmas in this case are easily resolved.  Such interventions are aimed at the public 
as a whole (high coverage), thus the effect or outcome measure should be apparent at population 
level.  However, Powers and Faden caution that public health “gets it wrong” if it is solely 
concerned with outcomes.  They state that “unlike either beneficence-based or utilitarian 
justifications for public health, by situating the focus on well-being within a theory of social 
justice, we capture what we believe are the twin moral impulses that animate public health: to 
improve human well-being by improving health and to do so in particular by focusing on the 
needs of those who are most disadvantaged. A commitment to social justice, as we explicate it, 
attaches a special moral urgency to remediating the conditions of those whose life prospects are 
poor across multiple dimensions of well-being.  Placing a priority on those so situated is a 
hallmark of public health” (Powers & Faden, 2006:82).   
 
Balancing benefits, costs and risks 
Beneficent health policies and research must balance benefits against cost and risks.  Formal cost-
benefit analysis tools that lead to policy formulation are widely used.  They have the advantage 
that they avoid subjective and political decisions, yet they remain controversial.  Cost is 
calculated in monetary terms but benefits are more difficult to measure.  Quality-adjusted life 
years (QALYs) evaluate quality of life rather than only survival years.  As with other cost-
effectiveness analyses, utilitarianism is the “philosophical parent” and so certain well known 
challenges also occur.  Is a QALY equally valuable to old and young patients (pregnant women 
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are generally young), and what about non-health benefits that affect quality of life?  The danger is 
that “these techniques concentrate decision making authority in the hands of narrow, technical 
professionals e.g. health economists, who often fail to understand moral, social, legal and 
political constraints that legitimately limit use of these methods” (Beauchamp & Childress, 
2009:222).  According to Beauchamp and Childress, “no form of analysis has the moral power to 
dictate the use of a particular medical procedure” simply by virtue of the lowest cost-
effectiveness ratio (2009:223). Doctors use scientific evidence to take decisions, but when 
conclusive evidence is lacking, the “precautionary principle – better safe than sorry” is ethically 
justifiable in order to avoid serious or irreversible harm. 
 
Large numbers of indigent, fertile women in South Africa are powerless to acquire a medically 
balanced diet.  It is reasonable to assume that if low dose calcium fortification (supplementation) 
of staple foods carries low risks and decreases the incidence of a major disease such as pre-
eclampsia, then most women would accept this action to be in their best interests.  This would 
remove the conflict between respect for autonomy and beneficence and represent only soft 
paternalism.  Social justice would then require public health to expedite such fortification if it is 
within its power to do so.  At the moment the most practical way to achieve this would be for the 
state through the Health Ministry to require producers of basic staple foods such as flour, maize 
meal and bread to add 500mg of calcium per average daily portion or amount of the product 
consumed by an individual. 
 
 
2.4 Summary position 
In this chapter I have discussed pre-conception counselling, power relationships, the decision to 
procreate and fortification of staple foods in the context of pre-eclampsia.  I have proposed that 
where evidence-based information is robust, pre-conception counselling be conducted in a 
respectful, yet directive manner of shared responsibility that makes space for the doctor and the 
patient.  I have argued that reproductive autonomy is a fundamental human right that gives 
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couples the moral right to procreate.   Human life is valuable and it is only at extremes that are 
difficult to predict, that procreation becomes contentious.  I conclude that because women 
understand the social connectedness of care ethics as well as rights ethics, they are well placed to 
negotiate the extremes of these positions and make the right autonomous (in the noblest sense of 
the term) decision on whether to risk a pregnancy or not.  My argument here is for a relationship-
centred model of autonomy where a woman’s decision is informed by her values, including her 
relationship with her potential progeny, superimposed on information provided by a respectful, 
professional counsellor.  Fortification of staple foods with calcium in order to prevent pre-
eclampsia and its complications is at worst an example of soft paternalism.  If it is shown to be 
safe, effective and affordable, then social justice requires public health to expedite this 
intervention. 
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CHAPTER THREE: EARLY PREGNANCY - LESS THAN 24 WEEKS’ GESTATION 
 
3.1 Screening for pre-eclampsia 
 
The importance of pre-eclampsia has been set out in section 1.1.  Avoiding pre-eclampsia is  
considered to have important health benefits by such august organisations as the National 
Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the United Kingdom, and the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) (NICE, 2008; Conde-Agudelo et al., 2004).  Although the pathogenesis of 
the disease begins very early in pregnancy, the clinical manifestations only become apparent after 
the 20th week.  Despite the large amount of scientific and clinical effort that has been expended in 
the management of pre-eclampsia, delivery of the placenta (and necessarily the baby) remains the 
only definitive treatment that leads to resolution of the condition.  Apart from the primary 
prevention already discussed, many clinical trials have addressed secondary prevention of pre-
eclampsia i.e. once the patient is pregnant. Interventions have included anti-hypertensive agents, 
fish oil supplementation, calcium supplementation, supplementation with vitamins C and E, and 
antithrombotic agents (Barton & Sibai, 2008).  Of these, low dose aspirin has shown the most 
benefit, but the magnitude of this benefit is only small to moderate.  Early (≤ 16 weeks’ 
gestation) use of low dose aspirin is more effective at preventing early onset pre-eclampsia 
(Roberge et al., 2012).  Another benefit is that low dose aspirin has a good safety profile (Askie 
et al., 2007). 
 
Modern public health care focuses not only on prevention of disease through lifestyle 
modifications but also through population-based screening programmes.  Such screening tests 
utilise biophysical and/or biochemical parameters together with personal information that are 
used to calculate the risk of developing a specific disease.  In contrast to diagnostic tests that are 
offered to individuals with disease, screening tests are offered to apparently healthy individuals.  
 
What are the criteria to be met by screening tests and how does pre-eclampsia perform? 
 The disease should pose an important health problem – pre-eclampsia certainly does. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
46 
 
 The disease should have a well understood aetiology – pre-eclampsia is still not fully 
understood. 
 There should be a recognisable early stage – an understanding of a biochemical imbalance 
of angiogenic and anti-angiogenic factors in the maternal blood is developing. 
 Early effective treatment should be available – early low dose aspirin is a partial answer. 
 There should be a suitable test that is accurate, rapid, non-invasive, inexpensive and easy 
to perform in early pregnancy – the proposed combined test performs well but will take 
time to become available in developing countries and will not be cheap. 
 This test should be acceptable to the population – the combined test would be. 
 There should be adequate facilities for the management of cases – this is important in 
developing countries where the greatest burden of disease is found. 
 The physical/psychological harm to those screened should be less than the benefits - yes. 
 The programme should be cost-effective – this must still be properly determined. 
(Adapted from Wilson & Junger, 1968). 
 
When screening in obstetrics is mentioned, many automatically think of the well debated 
screening programmes for fetal chromosomal diseases such as Down’s syndrome.  Jørgensen et 
al., have opined that the genetic screening programmes have largely been technology driven, 
ignoring the moral questions that should be asked before implementation.  They question whether 
new clinical methods enhance patient autonomy or simply realise technologically achievable 
socio-economic goals (Jørgensen et al., 2006).  Screening based on history and biophysical risk 
factors such as weight, blood pressure and proteinuria is standard practice in obstetrics but only 
identifies about 30% of cases that will develop early, severe pre-eclampsia (DiGiovanni, 2010).  
No other single screening test has proven to be accurate enough to replace this practice.  
 
Recently a new combined test utilising biochemical parameters (including angiogenic and anti-
angiogenic factors [proteins influencing blood vessel formation] in the maternal blood), 
biophysical parameters and personal information e.g. race and age, has performed well in 
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predicting the risk of pre-eclampsia, long before the clinical syndrome becomes manifest.  
Because the prevalence of pre-eclampsia in the general population is “relatively low”, such a test 
must have a high detection rate (DR) and a low false positive rate (FPR) according to Conde-
Agudelo et al., (2004).  I will return to this point with regard to pre-eclampsia specifically.  
Public health policy generally relies on utilitarian principles, so is it problematic if only a small 
number of the population benefit?  The answer is no, if the benefit to those persons is great and 
the harm caused to those for whom the test was unnecessary, is minimal.  In this sense there is 
still a greater benefit for the population (Jørgensen et al., 2006). The proposed advantages of the 
combined screening test for pre-eclampsia are: 
 Begin early preventative treatment with aspirin – unfortunately only moderate benefit. 
 Refer to a higher level of clinical care and surveillance. 
 Promote distributive justice by allowing the most effective distribution of medical 
resources to those who will benefit most by early detection. 
 Lower rates of pre-eclampsia and its complications. 
 
In terms of accuracy, the combined test has achieved a sensitivity (true positive) of 94.1%, a 
specificity  (true negative) of 94.3%, with the likelihood ratio of 16.5 (high) for a positive test 
and 0,06 for a negative test, thus easily meeting the WHO standards (Poon et al., 2009).  WHO 
criteria expect a high detection rate (DR) and a low false positive rate (FPR).  In utilitarian terms 
this comes from comparing the population benefit with the harm of the same test.  However this 
rationale is derived from genetic screening tests where a false positive test for Down’s syndrome 
may have the devastating result that a normal baby is aborted.  In the context of pre-eclampsia, a 
false positive test would currently result in the patient receiving aspirin therapy (which is safe, 
cheap and widely available), increased surveillance and perhaps anxiety. Thus the false positive 
result in pre-eclampsia is less “dangerous” than the false positive result for Down’s syndrome.  
However, in the future some women might use the screening test for pre-eclampsia to decide 
whether or not to continue with the pregnancy where abortion is an option (DiGiovanni, 2010).  
When formulating a screening test for pre-eclampsia, it therefore seems wiser to aim for a higher 
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detection rate and accept the trade-off of a higher false positive rate, as the risks of a false 
negative result, which deprive a patient at high risk of pre-eclampsia of prophylaxis and increased 
surveillance, are greater. 
 
Counselling and consent 
To end this sub-section I will return to the theme of counselling and consent, this time in the 
context of antenatal (prenatal) screening.  Angus Clarke has stated that “the decision of a health-
care system or of individual professionals to offer prenatal screening for any condition inevitably 
conveys a recommendation to pregnant women that accepting the test is the responsible course of 
action” (2012:253).  So although the language of choice, autonomy and consent is used, the mere 
fact that a structured screening programme exists, conveys a message that contradicts the 
“veneer” of neutrality.  Those who choose not to comply with the “standard” screening policy 
may be regarded as irresponsible and later blameworthy if a complication does occur.  In my own 
clinic, I prefer my trainees to state that a patient declined rather than “refused” a test that was 
offered.  When performed professionally, counselling before screening shows respect and 
enhances a woman’s autonomy.  As discussed earlier, beneficence and non-maleficence are 
always “in the mix” when counselling is performed, as “respecting patients as persons (a 
categorical  imperative) involves more than viewing them as autonomous persons, it involves 
providing good and avoiding harm (in this case through screening)” (Jørgensen et al., 2006).  In 
pregnancy women seek medical care precisely to avoid adverse outcomes. 
 
One of the fundamental moral obligations expected of physicians is to seek a greater balance of 
clinical benefit over harm for their autonomous patients. This is done through meeting the 
requirements of informed consent as discussed in section 2.1.  But what type of consent is 
required in each context? If a test is good, does it matter if consent is not “fully informed”?  The 
United Kingdom General Medical Guidance on consent to screening states:  
“You should explain carefully the purpose of screening; the likelihood of positive or 
negative findings and the possibility of false positive or negative results; the 
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uncertainties and risks attached to the screening process; any significant medical, 
social or financial implications of screening and follow-up plans, including the 
availability of counselling and support” (General Medical Council, 2008). 
Clearly women must be actively involved in the decision making process which, in truth, 
sometimes invokes the least infringement principle in order to achieve population-based health 
goals. Yet the level of consent required for a screening test for pre-eclampsia has been debated.  
If the test provides population-based health benefits that allow resources to be allocated where 
they are most needed, is it necessary to seek individual consent, or could an opt-out approach be 
justified (Jørgensen et al., 2006)?  To answer this question, the public goal of screening for pre-
eclampsia must be very well defined while balancing the deontological respect for autonomy with 
the net population utilitarian-based benefits that are still to be accurately determined in this case. 
Regarding individual consent, I have already argued that providing neutral, non-directive 
information can be less respectful and fail to enhance autonomy.   If the combined test offers 
robust benefits, and the harm of a false negative test is minimised, doctors should be obliged to 
recommend it.  However this recommendation may never be coercive or deceptive.  Despite the 
currently limited methods for secondary prevention, the benefits of a screening programme for 
early, severe pre-eclampsia seem to far outweigh the risks but the level of consent will still need 
to be determined. 
 
3.2 The ethical concept of the fetus as a patient 
 
While the moral (and legal) status of a new-born baby is clearly established, the moral status of 
the fetus has elicited much debate.  Does a fetus have full moral status and if so at what stage of 
development is it acquired? 
 
“To have moral status is to deserve the protection afforded by moral norms” but “such 
protections are afforded only to entities that can be morally wronged by actions” (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2009:66).  How do we identify those who have full moral status?  Does it require 
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human dignity, sentience or rationality?  Beauchamp and Childress argue that the properties put 
forward in prominent theories alone are not enough to resolve the issue but that “collectively 
these theories can be used to provide us with a general, though untidy framework for handling 
problems of moral status” (2009:67).  They list five theories which despite their strengths, all fail 
to give an adequate account when considered alone. 
 A theory based on human properties.    
 A theory based on cognitive properties. 
 A theory based on moral agency. 
 A theory based on sentience. 
 A theory based on relationships. 
 
Beauchamp & Childress are concerned that parties select their criteria for moral status to match 
their pre-theoretical orientations, including political and religious ones.  The proposed solution is 
to accept as general, the criteria advanced in the first four theories, while adding the fifth theory 
as another relevant dimension. 
 
Next the issue of potentiality, which is prominent in theories of moral status merits mention.   
Some hold that “it is morally wrong to intentionally cause a being with the potential to develop 
status-conferring properties to lose or fail to realise that potential” with the fetus being a case in 
point (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:83).  However, individual rights may sometimes be 
justifiably overridden by the rights of others, and not all individuals with moral status, have it 
without qualification.  It is also not valid to argue that all potential must be fulfilled.  This 
question is, for example, raised by the phenomenon of a young child with excellent hand-eye 
coordination. Such a child undoubtedly has the potential to become an excellent pick-pocket. But 
we will agree that the latter is a kind of “potential” that, morally speaking, should not be fulfilled.  
Using the fourth theory (sentience), moral status may be proportional to the quality of sentient 
life.  By applying this approach, the moral standing of zygotes, embryos, fetuses and new-borns 
increases continuously, and a pregnant woman would have a higher status than her fetus (Strong, 
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1997:457-478).  On this theme, John Harris has stated that “what we need to know is not when 
life begins, but rather when life begins to matter morally?” with the correlated question being 
“not when does life end, but when does life cease to matter morally?” (Harris, 1985).  Both of 
these questions may be relevant in section 3.3.  Ultimately, with the help of specification, “a 
plausible, philosophically defensible, practical theory of moral status is the most we can expect” 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:85). 
 
In the last few decades two apparently opposing positions have emerged in obstetrics and 
gynaecology.  On the one hand, the termination of pregnancy has become a clinically, legally and 
ethically accepted option; while on the other hand impressive advances have been made in the 
treatment of fetal conditions.  These treatment options have promoted the concept of the fetus as 
a patient in perinatal medicine, but how does this concept function and when does it apply?  
Chervenak and McCullough have written extensively on this concept which is based on two 
ethical principles, namely beneficence and respect for autonomy (2008).  Through beneficence 
the obstetrician has an obligation to seek the greater balance of clinical benefit over clinical harm.  
Chervenak and McCullough see beneficence as a first principle dating back to Hippocrates and 
importantly, non-maleficence in the form of primum non nocere as a more recent and second 
principle.  They argue that if primum non nocere was made the primary principle then all 
invasive aspects of perinatal medicine would become unethical due to their risks (Chervenak & 
McCullough, 2008).  The pregnant patient has her own set of values and beliefs through which 
she makes health related judgements. This is translated into clinical practice through respect for 
autonomy and informed consent.  The obstetrician has an obligation to act beneficently towards 
the pregnant woman and to respect her autonomy. 
 
Now we turn our attention to the fetus. “The fetus cannot be said to possess moral values and 
beliefs, because of its insufficiently developed central nervous system.  We cannot say with 
confidence that the fetus possesses independent moral status and generates its own rights” 
(Chervenak & McCullough, 2008).  The obstetrician therefore has no autonomy-based 
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obligations towards the fetus.  However, the obstetrician does have a perspective on the health of 
the fetus and therefore has beneficence-based obligations to the fetus, but only if that fetus is a 
patient!  According to Chervenak and McCullough the fetus becomes a patient when: 
  the mother confers that status by presenting it to the obstetrician and 
 there exist interventions whether diagnostic or therapeutic that are reliably expected to 
result in a greater balance of clinical good over harm for the child that the fetus is 
expected to become in the future.  (Chervenak & McCullough, 2008). 
 
An advantage of the “fetus as a patient” concept is that it bypasses the language of fetal rights, 
which in South African law, and according to Chervenak and McCullough, has no application to 
the fetus in obstetric ethics (Chervenak & McCullough, 2008; Moodley, 2011).  How does 
viability influence this concept?  Viability can be loosely defined as the ability of the fetus to live 
after delivery, even if technological support is needed, and subsequently become a child.  The 
gestational age equated with viability varies according to the availability of skills and technology.  
Although exceptions are made, the threshold for viability has moved from 28w0d gestation in the 
1990,s to 26w0d at Tygerberg Academic Hospital where the author of this thesis practices.  The 
threshold in many developed countries is at 23-24 weeks’ gestation (DiGiovanni, 2012; 
Chervenak & McCullough, 2008).  We should also note the clear conditional threshold of 20 
weeks’ gestation for termination of pregnancy in South African law (Government Gazette No. 
30790; Moodley, 2011a:257).  Viability is important because it heralds a threshold at which the 
moral/ethical perspective changes.  From a moral perspective, the previable fetus is not a patient 
unless its mother, through her autonomy bestows that status, which she is free to confer or 
withdraw according to her values and beliefs.  In contrast, the viable fetus is a patient from an 
ethical perspective, independent of a pregnant woman’s autonomy to confer that status 
(Chervenak & McCullough, 2008).  Despite this change the pregnant woman’s autonomy over 
her own body and the pregnancy that is part of it, still has priority.  The challenge for the 
obstetrician is to balance the autonomy- and beneficence-based obligations to the woman with the 
beneficence-based obligations to the fetus.  These obligations that will sometimes clash are 
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discussed further by way of clinical examples in Chapter 5 and commentary in Chapter 6, page 
83. 
 
3.3 Termination of pregnancy (<24 weeks) 
 
Background 
Pre-eclampsia that develops in the mid-trimester (< 28 weeks’ gestation) is a challenging 
problem as explained in Chapter One (Hall et al., 2001).  I re-iterate that pre-eclampsia only 
becomes clinically manifest at ≥ 20 weeks’ gestation, so in this section we are dealing with 
pregnancies from 20w0d-23w6d.  In 1988 Pattinson et al., reported no fetal survival when 
mothers presented with pre-eclampsia before 24 weeks (1988).  In practice this means that the 
previable pregnancy could not be extended forward to viability.  Subsequently, the largest 
reported study on expectant management of early pre-eclampsia, only offered expectant 
management from 24 weeks’ gestation (Hall et al., 2000a).  In a review of studies in the literature 
on expectant management of pre-eclampsia remote from term, Sibai and Barton reported that the 
overall perinatal mortality rate at < 25 weeks was extremely high (83%) and maternal 
complications were substantial (57%).  Based on this review they recommended that patients at ≤ 
23 weeks should be offered termination of pregnancy, whereas those at ≥ 24 weeks could be 
offered expectant management following extensive counselling (Sibai & Barton, 2007).  This 
recommendation was confirmed by Bombrys et al., one year later (2008).  In Chapter One I 
explained that expectant management of early, severe pre-eclampsia is offered to patients in 
tertiary institutions by maternal-fetal sub-specialists who meticulously monitor the mother and 
her fetus in order to gain 1-2 weeks’ of gestational age, because even this short period of time 
gained in utero, remote from term, markedly improves perinatal outcome.  However, if the 
chances of reaching viability are dismal, then there is no clinical reason to continue the 
pregnancy when the mother remains at high risk of further complications.  In this scenario the 
interests of the woman and her fetus appear to be in conflict. The previable pregnancy will be 
terminated (aborted) and the fetus will die, either during the process or shortly after birth.  If both 
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had equal status, treatment of the one most at risk should be given priority (Adams et al., 2003); 
however in this case the pregnant woman’s autonomy has priority (DiGiovanni, 2010).  When a 
pregnant woman is critically ill, the doctor’s duty of beneficence in saving her life and health 
overrides the duty of beneficence to the fetus. 
 
The futility issue 
In the paragraph above I make the statement that “if the chances of reaching viability are dismal, 
then there is no clinical reason to continue the pregnancy”.  This raises the concept of medical 
futility.  Futility may be at issue in many clinical scenarios but it is most often framed in the end-
of-life context.  During the mid-1980s’ to mid-1990’s period, the futility debate raged back and 
forth.  In their article on the rise and fall of the futility movement, Helft et al., made the following 
observations “The movement to establish a policy on futile treatment was an attempt to convince 
society that physicians could use their clinical judgement or epidemiologic skills to determine 
whether a particular treatment would be futile in a particular clinical situation.  The idea was that 
once such a determination had been made, the physician would be allowed to withhold or 
withdraw the treatment, even over objections of a competent patient” (2000).   
 
Schneiderman, who has made important contributions to the debate, has used common sense 
notions and statistical assumptions regarding outcomes in order to frame a broadly acceptable 
definition of futility (2011).  He has also argued that a treatment effect is not necessarily a 
benefit.  A recent formulation of his definition of futility is therefore: “that medical futility is the 
unacceptable likelihood of achieving an effect that a patient has the capacity to appreciate as a 
benefit” (Schneiderman, 2011).  The argument follows that once a treatment is accepted as futile 
the doctor will have no ethical obligation to provide it. 
 
Implicit in the definition of futility is that it has quantitative and qualitative components.  These 
two components can be traced back to writings by Hippocrates and Plato. “Whenever the illness 
is too strong for the available remedies, the physician surely must not expect that it can be 
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overcome by medicine … To attempt futile treatment is to display an ignorance that is allied to 
madness” (Hippocratic Corpus, 1977).  This illustrates the quantitative aspect.  Although 
philosophers such as Hume and Popper have pointed out that even if A follows B, a hundred 
times, one can never be absolutely certain that the same thing will happen again (Popper, 1961), 
reasonable physicians must accept the evidence that they have observed, as this forms the 
foundation of clinical medicine.  For example, rigorous quantitative physiology-based systems 
such as the APACHE score have been developed to predict which patients will die in the critical 
care environment.  On this basis statisticians build in thresholds of significance (typically < 5%) 
supported by confidence intervals (typically at 95%).  However these systems provide accurate 
prognostication for groups rather than individuals (Helft et al., 2000). Although the physician is 
never absolutely certain the quantitative approach helps physicians overcome the paralysis of 
uncertainty.  There is also a qualitative component to futility.  “For those whose lives are always 
in a state of inner sickness Asclepius (a physician) did not attempt to prescribe a regime to make 
their life a prolonged misery.  A life with preoccupation with illness and neglect of work is not 
worth living” (Plato, 1981). The patient must have the capacity to appreciate the treatment as a 
benefit.  To merely preserve a vegetative state or prolong significant suffering without the 
prospect of improvement is qualitatively futile.  When treatment serves no purpose, the focus 
must shift from futility to the ethics of care, specifically comfort care.   The physician always has 
an obligation to alleviate suffering, enhance well-being and support patient dignity in the final 
stages of life (Schneiderman, 2011). 
 
In Chapter 2, I raised the issue of the battle for power.  One may ask the question of who has the 
right to decide whether medical care is futile or not.  Here one may observe that the autonomy of 
patients is in conflict with the autonomy of doctors.  Although doctors might believe that they are 
best placed to make this judgement on objective grounds, others have argued that it is incorrect to 
regard futility as an objective entity and that patients, with their subjective views and goals are 
best able to judge what is beneficial to them (Lantos et.al., 1989).  This position carries the 
support of authors such as Veatch, Brett and McCullough (Veatch, 1994; Brett and McCullough, 
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1986), while Youngner states that doctors should only “frame the choices by describing 
prognosis and quality of life” (Youngner, 1988).  The counter-argument is that doctors are not 
obliged to provide care with no proof of benefit and that complete respect for patient autonomy 
reduces a doctor “from a moral agent to an extension of the patient’s wishes” (Paris and Reardon, 
1992).  Doctors should act with the virtue of integrity, exercising their knowledge through honest 
appropriate counselling and practice.  They should not provide false hope by discussing futile 
options as this only undermines patient autonomy.  Brody has stated categorically that “society 
cannot dictate to medical professionals the practice of their integrity” (Brody, 1994). 
 
Next, there is the principle of distributive justice.  In clinical medicine, respect for the patient’s 
autonomy is a fundamental value.  In fact a competent adult has “a close to absolute moral and 
legal right to refuse treatment, with limited exceptions in situations in which refusing treatment 
harms others” (Baily, 2011).  However there is a difference between refusing treatment and 
demanding it.  The right to receive an appropriate standard of health care is well accepted, but 
this right is not unlimited.  Medical treatment is almost always an expensive limited resource.  
Mary Ann Baily has put it this way: “Currently concern about ethics in medical decisions is too 
easily portrayed as in opposition to concern about cost: the ethical physician or advocacy group 
heroically faces off against the amoral bean-counters.  This is a false picture.  The truth is, cost is 
an ethical issue” (2011). 
 
In this sub-section (3.3) we are dealing with the counselling of a pregnant woman with severe 
pre-eclampsia before 24 weeks’ gestation, who will be offered a termination of pregnancy 
because of the extreme risks to her own life and health, and because the hope for the fetus 
reaching viability is “futile”.  Consensus definitions on futility have proved elusive and ranking 
levels of autonomy has not helped.  In the clinical scenario, professionalism and virtue moves 
beyond these disputes.  Honest communication in an environment of trust is required.  
Experienced doctors recognise clinical situations in which treatment is futile and they should 
inform patients and their families thereof.  These important decisions should not be taken by 
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individuals alone but rather with multi-disciplinary input.  In addition, the principle of 
distributive justice has led to the establishment of hospital and regional policies to guide 
treatment.  Finally, the judgement that treatment is futile is not the end of care. The obligations to 
alleviate suffering and support dignity remain in the form of comfort care. 
 
Applied clinical ethics 
The issues surrounding termination of pregnancy “on demand” or following patient requests have 
been well described and debated.  I want to focus on the particular and different clinical scenario 
just described and extrapolate the insights of some authors in the field.  I will first examine moral 
issues concerning three variations on the recommendation to terminate the pregnancy in this 
clinical situation. 
 The pregnant mother accepts the medical recommendation to terminate the pregnancy, the 
fetus is previable and not a patient.  This is the standard position. 
 The moral dilemma if the fetus is regarded as a person. 
 The moral dilemma if the mother declines termination of the pregnancy. 
  
My purpose is to discuss the ethical issues but I will first state the legal background in South 
Africa.  There are three medical indications for termination of pregnancy after 20 weeks, of 
which two apply in this contest: 
 Where continued pregnancy would endanger the woman’s life (main focus). 
 Where continued pregnancy would pose a risk of injury to the fetus (Moodley, 2011a). 
 
An important aspect of the abortion debate concerns the personhood or moral status of the fetus.  
For the purposes of this focussed discussion the point has been sufficiently elaborated in section 
3.2. Abortion is often considered as a paradigm example of maternal-fetal conflict but this only 
makes sense if the fetus has interests (moral status~personhood). As I have pointed out, this is 
debatable in varying degrees up to viability. If one accepts the latter position then abortion does 
not pit the interest of the pregnant mother against her fetus up to that stage (Steinbock, 
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2012:150).  I will now move past the debates surrounding early abortion of unwanted 
pregnancies that have been carefully discussed in texts such as the one by Mary Anne Warren 
(2012) to the first version of our scenario, which is not uncommon in the context of tertiary 
referral practice. 
 
Case 3: A pregnant woman with severe pre-eclampsia is referred in at 22 weeks.  The 
mother is stabilised and the diagnosis confirmed.  Because the fetal prognosis is 
dismal (futile) at this stage and pre-eclampsia holds significant risks to the mother, 
she is counselled and consents to termination of pregnancy.   
 
The situation satisfies two South African legal requirements for late termination mentioned 
earlier. This anguished decision usually occurs in the context of a wanted pregnancy.  The ethical 
issues involved in scenarios where the pregnancy is “wanted” may be thought to be different 
from those where the mother has no concern for the fetus.  Eileen McDonagh, an American 
political scientist has previously sought to unite opponents and proponents of abortion through an 
argument that justifies abortion not in terms of a woman’s right to choose, but in the granting of 
her consent to the further continuation of the pregnancy (2002:222).  This argument where 
maternal autonomy comes out “trumps” is similar to that of Chervenak and McCullough, where a 
pregnant woman and not her fetus has autonomy, and that through this maternal autonomy she is 
free to confer or withdraw “patient” status on her previable fetus according to her values and 
beliefs (Chervenak & McCullough, 2008). In Bonnie Steinbock’s opinion “the long-term 
interests of a pregnant woman in preserving her life and health surely outweigh the interests of a 
doomed fetus even if it temporarily experiences unavoidable pain” (2012:151). In this scenario 
the doctors have acted with beneficence, respected the autonomy of the competent patient and 
reasoned along utilitarian lines of thinking with regard to the greatest amount of happiness.  In 
the somewhat similar and famous case of Angela Carder the initial reasoning of the hospital 
administrator was that it is morally preferable to save one life than to lose two (van Niekerk, 
2011).  In the process of termination in the described clinical scenario, the fetus usually dies 
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during the induced labour (termination) due to pre-eclampsia-induced placental dysfunction and 
the limited fetal reserves of severe prematurity.  We now encounter the rule of double effect 
(RDE) that “incorporates a very influential distinction between intended effects and merely 
foreseen effects” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:162).  The rule is rooted in the moral theory of 
Aristotle that emphasises a person’s intention, and in Bentham’s theory on the consequences of 
actions.  If the physician, through the termination of pregnancy, intended to save the life of the 
mother and did not intend to cause the death of the fetus, then such an act was not morally wrong 
according to the RDE.  However “slippery-slope” arguments must always be considered 
seriously. 
 
I now consider a different twist in the same case scenario.  What if we grant this fetus the moral 
status of personhood from conception?  The 22 week fetus would already be severely damaged 
through pre-eclampsia mediated placental dysfunction, but I will also ignore that fact for now.  
Would this change our moral perspective?  The fundamental principle of non-maleficence 
imposes the obligation not to harm others (primum non nocere) that is generally more stringent 
than the obligation of beneficence.  However, according to Beauchamp and Childress, 
mainstream moral philosophy does not draw a sharp distinction between the obligations of not 
harming, and helping others (2009:151).  The specifications of non-maleficence lead to moral 
rules which again are prima facie and not absolute such as do not kill and do not cause pain or 
suffering.  In clinical medicine the line between non-maleficence and beneficence can be blurred 
as in this case the doctor must harm (kill) the fetus in order to save the mother.  If the fetus is a 
person, are we treating it merely as a means to the end of saving the mother’s life or are we 
working toward the overall best outcome?  In this sense deontology and consequentialism clash 
but Beauchamp and Childress would remind us of the prima facie nature of moral rules. 
 
In a well-known paper, introducing the model of the “famous violinist”, Judith Jarvis Thomson 
argued that even assuming full moral status for the fetus, there are sometimes morally sound 
reasons to sanction abortion (1971).  If mother and fetus had equal rights, some would argue that 
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abortion/termination (killing the fetus) would be wrong even if the mother’s life was at risk and 
we were letting her die.  But it is difficult to find a moral difference between “killing” and 
“letting die” (Rachels & Rachels, 2010).  Part of the problem lies with the focus on what the 
“third party”, namely, the doctor may or may not do, when an abortion is requested, as the doctor 
is seen to be the one who is “killing or letting die”.  Judith Jarvis Thomson is anxious not to 
refuse to grant the mother the very status that is so firmly insisted on for the fetus.  When looking 
at the mother, she asks “does a mother not have the right to decide what happens in and to her 
body?” On this basis, her right to life and bodily autonomy outweigh the fetus’s right to life.  “It 
cannot seriously be said that she must sit passively by and wait for her (own) death”; and with 
reference to her model Thomson states “if anything in the world is true, it is that you do not 
commit murder, you do not do what is impermissible if you reach around your back and unplug 
yourself from the violinist to save your life” (Thomson, 1971).  The point is also elaborated by 
Eileen McDonagh who points out that a major justification for killing a living thing, including a 
person, is self-defence (2002:223).  In this regard even the law recognises persons’ right to use 
deadly force to protect themselves from certain types of harm including death and serious bodily 
injury e.g. renal failure.  In her opinion, self-defence (with deadly force) in this context does not 
merely excuse the action; it justifies it (McDonagh, 2002:225)!  Ultimately, though with some 
qualifications, Thomson argues that the right to life does not guarantee the right to use another 
person’s body, even if that body is needed for life itself.  In this scenario, the fetus’s rights are 
only violated if it is killed unjustly. 
 
In the final version of this clinical scenario, certain mothers decide to decline the offer of 
termination, often based on their own religious values or beliefs.  Again this is not an uncommon 
occurrence in tertiary clinical practice.  Such decisions place enormous stress on professional 
doctors who are acutely aware of the serious, potential complications for the mother but must 
respect her autonomous decisions and continue with the highest standard of care.  Decisions are 
of course only autonomous if patients are properly informed and have processed that information.  
When patients initially decline, doctors should allow time for such processing and then return to 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
61 
 
ensure that there is adequate understanding and not simply false hope.  Part of the disclosure 
process is to involve not just the father of the pregnancy, but also (with the woman’s consent) 
other family members and authority figures such as ministers of religion, thereby acknowledging 
communitarian values. Informed refusal will be discussed further in section 5.3.  In most cases 
the pregnant woman will reconsider her position over time or as her condition deteriorates.  
When the fetus dies spontaneously in utero this also resolves the personal ethical dilemma for 
most women. 
 
In the case of early pre-eclampsia at < 24 weeks’ gestation, there are grave risks for the mother 
and a dismal prognosis for the fetus.  Under these circumstances, the fetus should not be regarded 
as a patient. 
 
3.4 Summary position 
 
In this chapter I have discussed antenatal screening for pre-eclampsia, the ethical concept of the 
fetus as a patient, futility and the termination of a non-viable pregnancy with early, severe pre-
eclampsia in order to save the mother’s life or prevent severe complications.  The ethical issues 
related to a screening programme are influenced by factors such as methodology and the 
availability of a “curative’ intervention. I have argued that the ethical matters be considered 
before possible implementation of this promising combined test.  Utilising the concept of “the 
fetus as a patient” is helpful in perinatal medicine.  An autonomous pregnant woman may choose 
to confer or deny this status to her previable fetus.  Obstetricians have to balance the autonomy- 
and beneficence-based obligations to the pregnant woman with the beneficence-based obligations 
to her fetus. Although it is always an anguished decision, most often in the context of a wanted 
pregnancy, the termination of a pregnancy with severe pre-eclampsia at <24 weeks is not morally 
problematic.  This remains the case even when considered from the (unusual) position of 
considering the previable fetus as a person. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: AGGRESSIVE OR EXPECTANT MANAGEMENT OF EARLY, 
SEVERE PRE-ECLAMPSIA 
 
4.1 Background, counselling and consent 
 
All pregnant women experience some form of discomfort during pregnancy and undergo direct 
risks to their health and life, the physiologic hypercoagulable state being just one example.  
Treatments vary in levels of discomfort from taking a short course of antibiotics to long hospital 
admissions.  While few parents will die through caring for their small infants (despite 
exhaustion), many women become ill and die in pregnancy (Bewley, 2002:135).  It is however 
common knowledge that pregnant women with wanted fetuses are often prepared to jeopardise  
their own health and even life prospects for sake of their pregnancies.  In this sense their actions 
are clearly supererogatory. 
 
In section 1.1 I explained the serious nature of pre-eclampsia.  When early, severe pre-eclampsia 
develops it is always in the mother’s interests to end the pregnancy.  The clinical course may be 
associated with progressive deterioration in both maternal and fetal conditions.  Thus, because 
delivery is the only way of arresting the disease, there is broad agreement on delivery in the 
presence of organ failure, fetal distress or once a gestation of 34 weeks has been reached.  
However, there are high rates of perinatal mortality for babies born very prematurely (remote 
from term).  When women diagnosed with severe pre-eclampsia, are stabilised and delivered 
within 48 hours, this is termed aggressive management (hurry up).  Additional complications or 
fear of progressive deterioration informs this approach.  In many tertiary units around the world, 
expectant management (wait) is offered to carefully selected women with early pre-eclampsia 
(24w0d – 33w6d) who respond to stabilisation (usually 24-48 hours), have no other maternal or 
fetal complications and who consent to tertiary, non-invasive maternal and fetal surveillance on a 
continuous in-patient basis.  Expectant management is then performed by a dedicated team of 
doctors until discharge after delivery (Hall et al., 2006; SMFM, 2011).  The gestational time 
gained by expectant management varies but is usually about two weeks (Hall et al., 2000).  The 
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ultimate goal of expectant management remains the safety of the mother and the delivery of a live 
infant who will not require intensive and prolonged neonatal care (Hall et al., 2000a). 
 
This background provides the basis for the next clinical application of counselling and consent.  
Although expectant management is now more widely advocated, particularly in developing 
countries where neonatal intensive care facilities are limited (Frias & Belfort, 2003), experts in 
the field have emphasized that expectant management should only be offered after “extensive 
counselling” (Sibai & Barton, 2007).  Why do they use the adverb “extensive”?  Having earlier 
examined beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, deontological and utilitarian perspectives, I 
have argued that clinical counselling is also influenced by: risks (maternal and fetal), asymmetric 
power within the doctor-patient relationship (section 2.1), the level of evidence for an 
intervention and the supererogatory nature (see preview of Chapter 4 in chapter overview of 
Chapter 1) of women with welcome pregnancies.  In an extensive review of the management of 
severe pre-eclampsia before 34 weeks’ gestation, the Society for Maternal-Fetal Medicine 
(SMFM) found that expectant management of selected patients can improve neonatal outcomes 
(SMFM Clinical Opinion, 2011).  In order to determine our mode of counselling we need to ask 
what level of evidence informed this conclusion.  In fact the highest level of evidence 
(randomised trials - category I) is small, although there are several large reassuring observational 
studies.  When considering expectant management we therefore have a situation with significant 
risks (for both mother and fetus), a paucity of category I evidence, good lower category evidence 
and mothers who have a supererogatory attitude.  Another independent factor that influences the 
decisions of these women is that even with severe hypertension they do not feel unwell, and may 
therefore underestimate the risks.  This adds to the responsibility of the doctor.  The mode of 
counselling should therefore be non-directive (due to the level of evidence), clear and thorough, 
while at the same time not overloading the patient with information.  This is how I interpret the 
term “extensive counselling” in this context.  In an attempt to improve patient comprehension 
before this emotionally charged decision, my clinical unit designed and tested a patient 
information sheet in a randomised, controlled trial.  Although this improved patients’ 
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understanding, it did not alleviate their anxiety (van der Merwe et al., 2011). It remains 
incumbent upon doctors to act calmly and professionally when counselling these women.  
 
4.2 Scarce advanced (extra-ordinary) resources 
 
A critical moral relationship exists between the doctor and a patient because he/she is well placed 
to act beneficently.  As such physicians experience an obligation to rescue.  In the context of 
early pre-eclampsia, doctors are obliged to “rescue” the mother and fetus if at all possible but to 
do this, tertiary medical care is required.  This takes the form of inpatient management by a team 
of sub-specialists and sometimes requires further admission to an adult or neonatal intensive care 
unit (Hall et al., 2006). 
 
High care and especially intensive care represents what has been called extra-ordinary treatment 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009).  Healthcare in South Africa is certainly challenged by resource 
constraints.  This raises the issue of justice, specifically distributive justice in resource 
management.  For Beauchamp and Childress, justice is explicated as “fair, equitable and 
appropriate treatment in the light of what is due or owed to persons”.  To this, distributive justice 
adds: appropriate distribution of resources “determined by justified norms that structure the terms 
of social co-operation” which includes the “distribution of all rights and responsibilities in 
society” (2009:241).  In South Africa, access to quality healthcare is largely limited by the ability 
to pay.  The issue of distributive justice only arises when there are conditions of scarcity and 
competition.  Tertiary and specifically intensive care services are scarce resources.  I will return 
to this point in later chapters. 
 
Principles of justice 
There are several principles of justice of which one is formal and the others, material. In their 
application they must be specified and balanced. Formal justice requires that equals must be 
treated equally and unequal’s, unequally. This principle lacks substance because it does not 
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qualify how persons should be treated equally or how to determine their equality, e.g. should all 
SA citizens have equal access to free healthcare or should pregnant women have priority? 
“Principles that specify the relevant characteristics for equal treatment are called material 
because they identify the substantive properties for distribution” (Beauchamp & Childress, 
2009:242).  Sometimes the relevant properties needed for a particular distribution are well 
established but in other contexts new policies require formulation.  In healthcare this finds 
particular relevance when new highly specialised (extra-ordinary), usually expensive forms of 
therapy become available in limited quantities. Thus abstract principles of justice can only 
provide rough guidelines for specific actions or policies. Further moral argument, specification 
and balancing, as well as the utilisation of experience and judgement are still required. 
Theories of justice 
According to Beauchamp and Childress, various theories “succeed only partially in bringing 
coherence to our fragmented visions of social justice” (2009:244). Current health care policies 
have competing objectives where one goal may undermine another e.g. seeking to provide 
expensive tertiary care but protecting public funds through cost-containment programmes.  At 
best these theories can help to delineate competing objectives acting to reduce the importance of 
some while promoting others to reach a balance. 
 Utilitarian theories. Utility demands that we maximise social welfare and that maximum 
utility constitutes maximum justice, but individual rights may be compromised. It seems 
unjust to maximise utility while denying health care to the sickest, most vulnerable 
populations. 
 Libertarian theories. Here “health care is not a right and the ideal system is privatised” 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:245). Robert Nozick believes that a theory of justice 
should affirm individual rights rather than create patterns of economic distribution e.g. 
equal distribution of health resources. Justice is seen in the operation of just procedures, 
not in the production of just outcomes, (Nozick, 1974:149-182). Denial of access to care 
through lack of finance is seen as unfortunate but not unjust, but libertarians do not 
oppose utilitarian patterns of distribution if they are freely chosen.  “The problem with 
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libertarian justice is that it disadvantages individuals and clinical services that do not 
generate large revenues but are essential to the organisation’s mission” (Chervenak et al., 
2013). 
 Communitarian theories. Whereas Mill, Rawls and Nozick promote models of society 
based on rights and contracts and a single theory of justice, “communitarians regard 
principles of justice as pluralistic, deriving from as many conceptions of the good as there 
are diverse moral communities” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:246). The community is 
for the individual and the individual for the community, but the needs of the community 
are given priority over those of individuals. 
 Egalitarian theories. In this just society everybody should receive an equal distribution of 
healthcare irrespective of their ability to pay. 
Chervenak et al., advocate a model of professional responsibility (see section 2.1) that invokes 
the corrective force of egalitarian justice to prevent the inequities of utilitarian and libertarian 
justice ( 2013). 
 
Tertiary care and specifically intensive care may be regarded as extra-ordinary treatment.  A 
widely referenced rule is that “extra-ordinary treatments can legitimately be foregone whereas 
ordinary treatments cannot legitimately be foregone” but the distinction is often vague and 
according to Beauchamp Childress, morally irrelevant (2009: 158).  The key is the balance of 
benefits and burdens to the individual. 
 
In specifying the principles of justice, knowledge of the effectiveness of treatment is essential in 
determining resource allocation.  In early pre-eclampsia, the randomised trials and observational 
studies already mentioned have demonstrated the particular benefits of expectant management for 
the fetus, in carefully selected cases.  The ultimate goal of expectant management remains the 
safety of the mother and the delivery of a live infant who will not require intensive and prolonged 
neonatal care.  What is important to note is that by safely prolonging the pregnancy, thereby 
increasing gestational age at delivery, excellent perinatal and neonatal survival rates can be 
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achieved, and the need for expensive neonatal intensive care support is markedly decreased (Hall 
et al., 2000a; SMFM, 2011).  This judicious use of neonatal intensive care improves distributive 
justice. Further developments in the care of very premature babies without adequate recourse to 
neonatal intensive care include avoiding mechanical ventilation by the use of continuous positive 
airways pressure (CPAP), and “kangaroo” care by the mother. The kangaroo position for the 
premature baby is an upright, prone position on the mother’s bare chest, between her breasts and 
under her clothes, thereby forming the maternal pouch (Hall & Kirsten, 2008). 
 
4.3 Restricting the freedom of pregnant women 
 
This unorthodox and aggressive intervention is usually considered in the context of the dangers 
posed by hard drug abuse in pregnancy.  In the field of severe hypertension and maternal-fetal 
medicine the culprits include cocaine and more commonly methamphetamines (“tik”) in the 
Western Cape.  However there are many other ways in which women put their fetuses at risk 
such as smoking, drinking alcohol or failing to attend clinics.  In this chapter I want to shift the 
focus and context to the related but different scenario of a woman offered expectant, inpatient 
management for early, severe pre-eclampsia.  As stated earlier, this partial “restriction of 
freedom” (i.e. inpatient management) is necessary to perform the clinical surveillance required to 
ensure the safety of the mother and fetus during the process.  The dedicated medical team 
managing these women must be able to respond quickly to early signs of impending 
complications. In this group, a moral relationship exists between the mother and her wanted fetus 
upon which she has conferred personhood (rights) and for that reason she voluntarily offers up 
her “outpatient freedom” for an undetermined period (usually about two weeks) before delivery, 
as well as after delivery to assist with the care of her small, premature baby until it is ready for 
discharge.  The inpatient stay after delivery often takes the form of “kangaroo care” once the 
maternal condition has resolved. 
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Being an inpatient for an undetermined period of time is challenging.  Compared to parents, 
pregnant women have a unique disadvantage in that they cannot be separated from their fetuses, 
but does this intimacy increase their obligations (Bewley, 2002)?  Many women are referred in 
from rural areas, and are thus far away from home.  They often come from low socio-economic 
circumstances making it difficult for their family members to visit, they have to change their 
habits in the hospital e.g. stop smoking and they are anxious about their pregnancies.  These 
women temporarily lose control over the circumstances in their homes, such as care of other 
children and the collection of finance and grants. What makes it even more difficult is that in 
many cases these mothers do not feel physically unwell.  These facts illustrate the point that in 
order to understand women’s choices we need to grasp what Engel has termed the 
biopsychosocial model (Engel, 1982). This means that comprehensive clinical judgement 
requires attention to both clinically relevant biomedical and psychosocial aspects of a pregnancy.  
Expectant management thus represents a multi-faceted “sacrifice” by the mother.  If she does not 
consent to this “restriction of freedom” package, expectant management is not possible and 
aggressive management (as previously described) is offered. 
 
Expectant (inpatient) management makes two important assumptions: 
 The fetus in this context has moral status and rights.  According to the “fetus as a patient” 
model (see section 3.2) the mother has conferred this status.  However, even if a woman 
declines expectant management, her viable fetus can still be regarded as having moral 
rights, although its mother is not prepared to accept trying to improve the neonatal 
outcome by prolonging the pregnancy.  In this case the mother’s claims of autonomous 
choice and bodily integrity outweigh the interest of the fetus in being born at a greater 
gestation.  The fact that a mother chooses to rank her interest above that of the viable 
fetus “trumps”, but does not remove fetal rights.  These mothers still care about their 
fetuses despite choosing not to “restrict their own freedom” for whatever reason.  Thus 
the obligation to care for the fetus, even through aggressive management remains.  Both 
the mother and the medical team have a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that the 
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fetus is born in good health.  “The rights it possesses in the future impose duties on us 
now to care for it, so as to ensure that it may achieve this personhood later” (Bewley, 
2002). 
 Sufficient justification for this “restriction of freedom” exists.  When involuntary 
restriction of freedom is considered e.g. for a cocaine addict, a powerful justification for 
overriding a person’s right not to be interfered with, must exist.  However, if a mother has 
obligations to her fetus, then so has society (Bewley, 2002).  In our context of voluntary 
“restriction of freedom” during expectant management of pre-eclampsia, we still need 
sufficient justification.  This is provided by the scientific evidence that has been 
discussed. 
 
4.4 Summary position 
 
In this chapter I have discussed counselling in a new context, the utilisation of scarce, advanced 
resources and the issue of restricting the freedom of pregnant women.  Based on the available 
scientific evidence, counselling stable women with early pre-eclampsia should be performed in a 
professional, calm, non-directive and thorough manner that takes account of the supererogatory 
nature of pregnant women.  Neonatal intensive care is an expensive and limited resource. The 
ultimate goal of expectant management remains the safety of the mother and the delivery of a live 
infant who will not require intensive and prolonged neonatal care.  This judicious use of neonatal 
intensive care improves distributive justice.  By consenting to expectant management, the 
pregnant woman voluntarily restricts her freedom.  This decision is morally undergirded by the 
value accorded to the viable fetus and the scientific evidence informing the decision. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: JUDGEMENTS OF NON-COMPLIANCE IN PRE-ECLAMPSIA 
 
5.1 Background and maternal-fetal conflict 
 
Women have moral obligations to avoid harming their fetuses.  “Just as parents have obligations 
to avoid exposing their born children to substantial risks of serious harm, so pregnant women 
have comparable obligations to the children they will bear” (Steinbock, 2012:158).  During 
pregnancy women do need to make sacrifices and take risks and while some actions are clearly 
morally wrong, such as using methamphetamines, other actions are morally equivocal.  Even 
amongst women with severe chronic illnesses that may accelerate if they become pregnant e.g. 
renal failure after previous pre-eclampsia, the desire to achieve pregnancy and motherhood can 
be overwhelming (Lockwood, 1999).  Falling pregnant against clear medical advice or failing to 
attend clinics is not uncommon behaviour and is frequently categorised as “non-compliance”.  
Doctors do well to ask themselves if this term is value-free or used to “reinforce the physician’s 
power and to label the patient as an object of concern rather than a partner in the clinical 
relationship” (Dickenson, 2002:6).  Generally patients can choose whether to heed professional 
advice, or not.  However, sometimes “failure to follow professional recommendations elicits 
pejorative judgements of non-compliance, and while these judgements are provoked by a failure 
to comply with specific advice, typically they are applied to the patient as a whole” (Baylis & 
Sherwin, 2002). 
 
A pregnant woman is more than a “fetal container” (Annas, 1986).  She is a person with her own 
interests and needs under the restrictive influence of pregnancy.  Maternal behaviour that harms 
the fetus and future child is categorised as maternal-fetal conflict but Bonnie Steinbock insists 
that this term is often misleading (2012:152).  Society and the medical profession are particularly 
sensitive about maternal harmful behaviour because such a patient is risking not only her own 
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health, but also that of her future child.  Social stereotypes expect women to be self-sacrificing 
and judge women especially harshly if they fail to make all reasonable efforts to protect the 
health of their developing fetuses (Bayliss & Sherwin, 2002:293).  Although the child harmed by 
maternal behaviour during pregnancy, had different rights at the time that the injury was inflicted, 
it does not lessen the obligation to avoid injuring a fetus that will develop into a child.  For 
Steinbock this is a continuous argument and thus the conflict here is not really with the fetus but 
with the future child (2012:152). Although women have prima facie obligations to avoid 
inflicting prenatal harm on future children, this moral obligation finds little expression in the law.  
Steinbock supports her argument that we have obligations to individuals not yet born by using the 
example of improper canning of baby food today that would harm a child born next week (2012).  
According to this reasoning, one may however legitimately question whether maternal harmful 
behaviour (e.g. drug abuse) is morally wrong when an abortion is planned, because in that case a 
child will not come into being. 
 
If we accept the “potentiality” argument of Steinbock, one model of understanding women’s 
obligations to their fetuses is to consider what is required from parents of children already born.  
“Our moral obligations to our children may be particularly broad and deep, but they do not 
overwhelm all other moral considerations in all circumstances” according to Murray (1991:107).  
This generally translates into protection from substantial risks of serious harm. There are many 
ways in which women put their fetuses at risk such as smoking, drinking alcohol or failing to 
attend clinics, but when it comes to specific risks such as occasional drinking during pregnancy, 
there is often disagreement amongst the experts.  Ultimately, any woman who will have a child is 
morally required to avoid harming the fetus, if this can be done without sacrificing her own 
important interests. 
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5.2 Understanding non-compliance 
 
Pregnant women and those considering pregnancy are bombarded with advice ranging from mere 
suggestions to professional recommendations.  In section 4.3, I introduced the biopsychosocial 
model of Engel which helps us understand the reasons for a patient’s behaviour.  Certain types of 
behaviour are not inherently problematic but merely informed or uninformed refusals.  Those that 
are problematic and thus likely to be judged as “non-compliance” are those where the patient fails 
to comply with her own choices (Baylis & Sherwin, 2002:286).  Despite this, medical 
professionals should deal with these situations in ways that still attempt to enhance autonomy, 
respect and integrity within the doctor-patient relationship. 
 
Case 4:  A 36-year-old, mother of one child, first presented for care very late in her 
pregnancy (28w5d gestation).  The patient lived in a town outside a secondary 
hospital in the Western Cape, approximately 100 kilometres away from the tertiary 
referral hospital.  A diagnosis of pre-eclampsia was made.  The mother, an obese 
smoker, had severe hypertension and the placenta of the fetus was functioning poorly.   
After a period of stabilisation she consented to expectant management of her 
condition as an inpatient at the tertiary hospital. 
 
Shortly after admission the mother received news that her 11-year-old son had not 
arrived at school.  According to the patient she had been transferred to the tertiary 
hospital before being able to make domestic arrangements and was now unable to 
contact family or friends as her phone’s battery was flat.  The understandably 
anxious patient wanted to return home. The social worker was consulted and 
reported back to the managing registrar (trainee specialist).  The head of the Special 
Care Unit (Prof. Hall) then contacted the specialist obstetrician at the secondary 
hospital to make specific individual arrangements for the patient.  The plan was that 
she would return home to address the pressing domestic issue and then present to the 
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secondary institution (closer to her home) the next day, if not for admission, then for 
full evaluation. 
 
 Although ambulance transport from the tertiary hospital was arranged for the 
patient, she left without informing the staff, taking a taxi home.  According to her 
“fellow” patients in the tertiary hospital, the patient arrived home safely, quickly 
located her son at a friend’s house but then decided not to return to either hospital.  
 
The interpretation of non-compliance 
As stated above, women are likely to receive a range of advice before, during and after 
pregnancy.  For example, if the woman in Case 4 had presented before pregnancy, she would 
have been advised to stop smoking, lose weight, take folate supplements, consider the effect of 
the inter-pregnancy interval, and have received counselling regarding chromosomal anomalies.  
From the woman’s perspective, this advice though sound, might have been impossible to follow.  
Those who fail to follow sound medical advice may be labelled as “non-compliant”.  Given the 
large amount of medical advice directed at pregnant women, it is likely that all women will 
diverge from the plan to some extent, but when do doctors evaluate this divergence as non-
compliance and when do they not? 
 
It seems that in order for the term non-compliance to be used, a doctor patient relationship must 
exist. If the woman in Case 4 had not presented for preconception counselling, she would still 
have known that smoking and obesity are unhealthy as such knowledge is widely available.  If 
she had fallen pregnant without addressing them there may have been some disapproving moral 
judgements, but her omissions would not be regarded as non-compliance.  On the other hand 
“The label non-compliant is readily assigned in cases where there is a perceived risk of serious 
harm for the fetus or the woman that is avoidable but for the woman’s failure to comply with her 
physician’s recommendations” (Baylis & Sherwin, 2002:290). 
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The term non-compliance might imply that the power in the doctor-patient relationship is 
inherently unequal.  In that sense labels of compliance or non-compliance are assigned by those 
with greater power (doctors) on those with lesser power (patients).  Doctors give directives but 
patients can only make requests.  Although this is often the de facto case, doctors must comply 
with professional norms and could be reported as non-compliant for failure to do so. 
 
The real problem with the label of non-compliance is that it often involves more than justified 
concern on the part of the doctor, it also expresses or implies disapproval.  Something has gone 
seriously wrong in the relationship and blame is assigned (Baylis & Sherwin, 2002:291).  In the 
increasingly litigious medical environment, the doctor may be concerned that the unnecessary 
risks taken by the patient might lead to complications with legal consequences.  For this reason 
medical staff are very quick in “demanding” that women sign the “red card” (a self-discharge 
document) when discharging themselves against medical advice.  It is interesting to note that 
there are opinions that rest the blame for patient non-compliance on doctors rather than on 
patients, as it is their responsibility to properly inform, educate and explain the importance of 
conscientiously following medical advice (DiMatteo & DiNicola, 1982, 251).  Once a label of 
non-compliance has been given, essential trust between the doctor and the patient is eroded and 
the patient’s agency is reduced in that she “is discouraged from determining her behaviour on the 
basis of her own perception of what constitutes a good outcome and how best to achieve it” 
(Baylis & Sherwin, 2002:292). 
 
Why might patients not comply? 
There is a wide variation among doctors in the use of the term non-compliant.  I have argued that 
the term is not value-free and may even be harmful. Baylis and Sherwin believe that it is useful to 
identify behaviours and to understand whether doctors and patients agree about the nature of the 
problem (2002, 293).   
 Deliberate refusals: value conflict.  Here patients reject medical advice that is contrary to 
their own values.  A woman with severe pre-eclampsia at <24 weeks’ gestation may 
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decline termination of pregnancy because she is opposed to abortion. She is unlikely to be 
labelled non-compliant but may feel less support from doctors who are anxious about 
potential complications associated with her choice. 
 Deliberate refusals: epistemological conflict. In the current era there is a vast amount of 
medical information in the public domain. Apart from this, women’s judgements are also 
influenced by personal experiences and those of family and friends.  In this case the 
woman may not agree with the information that informs her doctor’s recommendation. 
 Deliberate refusals: distrust.  Some women, particularly minority groups, different faiths 
or vulnerable groups such as refugees, see doctors as representing a culture that is hostile 
to them. 
 Lack of understanding.  Here patients do not follow medical advice because they do not 
fully comprehend it.  Disclosure of information takes time and requires patience.  
Language may also present a barrier which is why the author’s unit has designed a patient 
information leaflet to be used in combination with counselling (van der Merwe et al., 
2011).  Lack of understanding could also apply to incorrect use of medication or missed 
appointments. 
 Inadvertent non-compliance.  Sometimes the doctor and patient agree on the goals and yet 
the patient still does not act in accordance with the advice.  This might reflect too much 
advice or that she is unable to control her circumstances such as work environment, work 
hours or domestic circumstances.  This is a particular problem for women from low socio-
economic groups.  Hence the need to understand the biopsychosocial model. 
 
Application 
As stated earlier, expectant management of early pre-eclampsia requires inpatient management.  
This “restriction of freedom” is necessary to perform the clinical surveillance required to ensure 
the safety of the mother and fetus during the process. The alternative is aggressive management 
as explained in Chapter Four. In Case 4, the woman who initially consented to expectant 
management was free to withdraw that consent and request the alternative path without any 
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prejudice.  However, her psychosocial concerns for her 11-year-old son, led her to discount both 
medical options, thereby endangering her own health and that of her fetus.  The medical team did 
not label her as non-compliant, but sought to understand her moral dilemma more 
comprehensively and then made a medically compromising, individualised decision to assist her.  
Her decision not to accept either of the standard medical options was distressing to the staff who 
have witnessed cases where such women discharged themselves only to be brought back 
convulsing with eclampsia, intra-cerebral haemorrhage, placental abruption or an intra-uterine 
death.  The “sting in the tail” for the medical team in this case was that even when her evident 
social problem had been solved, the patient still did not return for care.  At this stage a label of 
non-compliance would seem to have been justified, but there may still have been other factors 
which the patient chose not to reveal. 
 
“In the ideal physician-patient relationship, responses to medical advice should be mutually 
satisfactory, based on mutual respect, mutual understanding and mutual responsibility” (Baylis & 
Sherwin, 2002:292).  This is of course not always possible.  However, the patient must not 
perceive the doctor as pressuring her into compliance or unfairly judging her to be irresponsible.  
When patients do choose not to comply with medical advice doctors must: 
 seek ways of providing health care that will still preserve patient integrity, 
 respect the patient’s choice, as decision-making authority is ultimately theirs, 
 examine all options in a sense of shared decision-making (see sections 2.1 & 4.1), 
 and empower women to pursue their chosen goals. 
As in Case 4, “this is not about better educating or motivating patients or more effectively 
counselling or persuading them to pursue a particular course of action, but is rather about 
developing creative strategies for dealing with obstacles that may not be evident or acknowledged 
by either the patient or her physician” (Baylis & Sherwin, 2002:299).  Ultimately the term non-
compliance does more harm than good!  
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5.3 Refusal of caesarean section 
 
Most women will adopt supererogatory actions to ensure that their babies are born in a healthy 
condition.  Caesarean section is a major operation that may be life-saving for a mother and/or her 
baby.  I have explained that by consenting to expectant management, a woman with early pre-
eclampsia is making sacrifices for-, or put another way fulfilling beneficence-based obligations to 
her viable fetus.  During the careful counselling process she is informed of the high probability of 
delivery by caesarean section, as the fetal condition may deteriorate rapidly.  I begin this sub-
section with an adapted case that I managed personally. 
Case 5: A 19-year-old, woman in her first pregnancy was referred to a tertiary 
hospital with pre-eclampsia at 28w2d gestation.  After stabilisation and evaluation of 
the mother and her fetus, she was counselled and accepted expectant management.  
The mother had severe hypertension and the fetus was growth restricted.  Eight days 
after admission the heart rate monitoring test on the fetus revealed ominous cardiac 
decelerations and the woman was counselled to undergo emergency caesarean 
delivery to save the baby.  She however declined to give consent for the operation. 
 
This case of informed refusal clearly illustrates points used in the debate on maternal-fetal 
conflict and non-compliance.  The patient first accepted care for herself and her fetus but then 
refused a therapeutic intervention to protect her endangered fetus.  How should we understand 
this?  The informed refusal may be explained by a different perception of autonomy and illness in 
communitarian-based societies as proposed by van Bogaert (2006), but I will propose a different 
explanation. 
 
In the past two decades, cases of legally enforced caesarean section have occurred in the United 
States (US) and in the United Kingdom (UK), but judging by Appeal Court decisions, they are 
now very unlikely (Savage, 2002).  In my opinion recourse to judicial authority should be 
avoided as it is clearly adversarial and leads to total breakdown in the doctor-patient relationship.  
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An ethical dilemma is not “solved” by a court’s decision.  The FIGO recommendations state that 
“Resort to courts is inappropriate and usually counterproductive.  No woman should be forced to 
undergo any procedure in order to preserve the life or health of her fetus, as this would be a 
violation of her autonomy and fundamental human rights”  (Schenker & Cain 1999).  However, 
doctors face a serious challenge when a pregnant woman makes choices that are inconsistent with 
the beneficence-based obligations the doctor has to the fetus or the woman.  McCullough and 
Chervenak have proposed “a clinical strategy that does not involve simply acquiescing to the 
pregnant woman’s decision or simply seeking to coerce her compliance, namely respectful 
persuasion” (153:1994) .  This involves reviewing the case information with the patient; 
explaining the doctor’s own reasoning as well as how other doctors might differ; explaining how 
to meet these objectives and showing the patient that her own values and beliefs are inconsistent 
with her decision, if this is indeed the case. 
 
Refusal of an emergency caesarean section for fetal distress causes consternation amongst 
medical staff because refusal seems irrational and they generally perceive the viable baby to have 
high moral status.  Indeed, the refusal of caesarean section presents a moral dilemma only if two 
conditions apply. 
 First, the right of a competent patient to refuse a medical intervention. 
 Second, the fetus must lack the status of a full legal person (Steinbock, 2012:155-156). 
Of course, the line between competent refusal and inability to consent can be difficult to 
distinguish in certain cases, a good example being fear.  Fear of an operation may be a rational 
reason for refusal to undergo it, but fear may also paralyse the will and thereby destroy the 
capacity to make a decision (Savage, 2002:270). If the latter is the case then overriding her 
refusal does not violate her autonomy.  Beauchamp and Childress have pointed out that “our 
obligations to respect autonomy do not extend to persons who cannot act in a sufficiently 
autonomous manner” (2009:105).   But what if the patient is competent but unreasonable?  
Pellegrino and Thomasma believe that in such a case the doctor should override an irresponsible 
refusal (1988:25,32,46-47).  Supporters of the “waiver theory” claim that once a woman has 
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waived her right to abortion, she is duty bound to do what is necessary to promote the best 
interests of the fetus (Nocon, 1999).  In this sense, her duty of beneficence to the fetus overrides 
her own right to autonomy.  However, the legal decisions in “forced caesarean” cases from the 
US and UK have more recently been described as “paternalistic” and “placing the non-existent 
legal rights of the fetus above the woman’s autonomy” (Savage 2002:277).  The concept of “best 
interests” applies to parties with legal rights.  The fetus does not possess legal rights but this does 
not mean it merits no protection as it certainly has interests.   In South Africa, the National 
Department of Health’s, Patient’s Charter does make provision for general informed refusal of 
treatment by a patient, thus providing general grounds for maternal refusal of a caesarean section 
(2000). 
 
In advancing arguments for the overriding of an informed refusal of e.g. caesarean section to save 
an endangered fetus, van Bogaert 2006) uses a well-structured approach based on the “fetus as a 
patient” principle advocated by McCullough and Chervenak  (1994).  According to these authors, 
the mother may convey the status of personhood to the fetus.  What is not clear is whether this 
status is permanent?  In Case 5, the mother accepted expectant management in the hospital, 
thereby indicating her concern and the granting personhood to her fetus.  However, when she 
declined caesarean section, was this status still operational or had it been revoked by her?  I have 
already indicated (in section 5.2) that consent can be autonomously withdrawn without the 
expectation of prejudice.   
 
Some would argue that the moral permissibility of refusing a caesarean section depends on the 
strength of the reasons given (Steinbock 2012:155).  An ugly scar would not be sufficient 
justification, but religious beliefs, or as stated above genuine fear would be.  Fear of the operation 
was a strong influence for the young woman in Case 5.  McCullough and Chervenak have argued 
that a case can be made for compulsory caesarean sections in cases of major placenta praevia.  
This is because the procedure unequivocally produces benefits for the woman and her fetus/baby. 
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In this scenario they consider any other judgement as irrational (McCullough & Chervenak 
1994:249-250). 
 
The current position of the legal profession and professional medical societies in the UK, US, 
Canada and others is that overriding the refusal of caesarean section by a competent woman is 
almost never justified (Savage, 2002:269,272; Steinbock, 2012:156).  The South African position 
is similar in that the fetus is without legal rights until birth, while maternal autonomy is strongly 
endorsed (Moodley, 2011a:254). These positions are based on the following considerations. 
 A competent adult has the right to refuse treatment. 
 Caesarean sections, though safe still carry risks. 
 The imposition of compulsory surgery is viewed as an assault on bodily integrity. 
 It is possible for a doctor to be wrong about the need for surgery.  However McCullough 
and Chervenak argue that the question is not whether doctors are infallible but whether 
their clinical judgement is reliable (1994:249-250). 
I conclude that the overriding of informed refusal of a medically indicated caesarean section, by a 
competent woman is almost never morally justified and I am uncertain how one would physically 
force the procedure on a woman.  If a woman does make the decision to decline a medically 
indicated caesarean section she must live with the consequences that must be clearly explained to 
her. 
  
5.4 Summary position 
 
In this chapter I have discussed the related concepts of maternal-fetal conflict and maternal non-
compliance that find application in the informed refusal of caesarean section.  Maternal 
behaviour that harms the fetus and future child is categorised as maternal-fetal conflict.  
However, any woman who will have a child is morally required to avoid harming the fetus, if this 
can be done without sacrificing her own important interests. The term non-compliance implies a 
hierarchical nature in the doctor-patient relationship. This reduces patient agency, erodes trust 
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and conflicts with informed choice.  Although there may be specific circumstances in which use 
of the term is justified, ultimately this “label” does more harm than good. The refusal of a 
medically indicated caesarean section, by a competent woman often places doctors in an 
agonising dilemma but overriding this decision is almost never justified. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  DELIVERY OF EXTREMELY PRETERM BABIES 
 
6.1 Background and counselling 
 
“The potential delivery of an extremely premature infant presents a clinical situation that raises a 
complex combination of medical, social, ethical, religious and economic issues. It is a unique 
medical encounter such that it is not about curing the patient.  Rather it is an encounter where 
counselling is assisting families in deciding between life and death underscoring the stressful 
nature for both patients and providers” (Srinivas, 2013). 
 
In the preceding chapters I have explained that dealing with early pre-eclampsia entails making 
decisions on delivery at and just beyond the threshold of viability.  In these circumstances 
survival and intact neurological survival, or put another way, survival without moderate to severe 
morbidity (handicap) become critical considerations.  There is an inverse relationship between 
gestational age at delivery and moderate to severe impairment (Moore et al., 2012).  In addition 
to the greater risk of permanent, significant morbidity associated with extremely preterm birth, 
fetuses from mothers with pre-eclampsia are often affected by severe growth restriction, which 
further increases these risks.  This represents a form of double jeopardy. 
 
Survival data and morbidity after birth at 22-26 weeks’ gestation 
A recent follow-up study from the United Kingdom evaluated medium-term outcomes after birth 
in this category.  It showed an encouraging improvement in survival but no significant reduction 
in the prevalence of severe disability (Moore et al., 2012).  The data from the United States 
although different, shows the same trends (NICHD, 2009; Mercurio, 2009).  Survival of a 
neonate born at 22-23 weeks is possible but the cost in terms of severe morbidity such as 
neurodevelopmental impairment is great.  Neurodevelopmental impairment has been defined as a 
Bayley mental developmental index or psychomotor developmental index < 70, moderate/severe 
cerebral palsy, bilateral blindness, and/or bilateral hearing loss requiring amplification (Mercurio, 
2009).  In Chapter Four, I explained that there is broad consensus that the perinatal outcome for 
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the specific condition of pre-eclampsia at gestations < 24 weeks is dismal.  Moving to the other 
end of this specified category, the general neurologically intact survival i.e. survival free of 
moderate or severe impairment is close to 60% at 26 weeks (Moore et al., 2012).  Thus < 24 
weeks and ≥ 26 weeks represent important lower and upper thresholds for counselling.  I will 
return to this point in section 6.2. 
 
Counselling, the ethics of decision making, useful models 
In earlier discussions on counselling I alluded to factors influencing the mode of counselling and 
the importance of a flexible approach determined by the clinical situation.  Counselling extremely 
stressed parents regarding resuscitation and or the possible outcomes of an extremely pre-term 
infant is very challenging.  In this clinical scenario, I will draw on generic principles discussed 
earlier but also incorporate a useful document from the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG, 2004).  To begin with, the doctor must have a good understanding of the 
scientific evidence for and against the decision at hand.  I have provided a succinct summary 
above to illuminate some applied ethics applications that will follow in this chapter.  During 
counselling and decision making (consent), the doctor must show respect for the patient 
(deontology, autonomy and respect for communitarian values), through beneficence and non-
maleficence ensure the greatest balance of benefit over harm (includes consequentialism), 
consider aspects of justice (e.g. scarce resources such as intensive care) and demonstrate virtues 
such as veracity or truth telling.  Chervenak and McCullough warn against ethical reductionism 
that occurs when “ethical reasoning appeals exclusively to one ethical concept in clinical 
circumstances that by their very nature require consideration of multiple, complementary 
concepts if those circumstances are to be adequately understood and responsibly managed.  
Rights-based reductionism commits the fallacy of reasoning about ethical issues in perinatal 
medicine on the basis of exclusively the rights of the fetus or the rights of the pregnant woman” 
(2012).  The rights of women are important in perinatal ethics but they are not exclusive. 
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A fully informed decision by an autonomous patient must be respected, even if it cannot be 
supported by the doctor when it clashes with his or her own ethical principles e.g. abortion.  I 
have made the point that in almost all situations the patient has the right to decline/refuse 
unwanted treatment but a point that I have not yet made is relevant to section 6.2.  That is, a 
patient does not have “a parallel right to demand treatment that the physician believes is not 
beneficial, unwise or overtly risky” (ACOG, 2004; Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:220).   
Throughout the chapters of this thesis I have emphasised that the approach to counselling must be 
flexible.  I have already referred to modes of counselling but the ACOG document proposes four 
useful models, all of which may be used according to the patient and the decision involved 
(2004).  The models will be applied to the case scenario in section 6.2.  The paternalistic and 
informative models represent opposite ends of the spectrum, while the other two are pragmatic, 
middle ground options. 
 The paternalistic model. Here the doctor might only present information on risks and 
benefits that she believes will lead that patient to make the “right” decision. I have 
discussed this in section 2.1. This approach/mode/model may be the best way to balance 
the ethical principles of beneficence and non-maleficence when patient autonomy is 
impaired. 
 The informative model. In this model “the patient has complete control and the 
physician’s values are not discussed”.  A detailed description of risks and benefits is 
given without prioritisation or recommendation of any option.  This model has a serious 
disadvantage in that it assumes that the patient can integrate complex medical information 
and “removes” the role of the doctor as a caring, expert partner in the decision making 
process.  The ACOG document states that “one of the many unfortunate consequences of 
the professional liability crisis is the unsubstantiated belief of some physicians that the 
informative model reduces the physician’s risk of liability” (2004).  Actually this model 
has limited application, as a doctor’s professional judgement is of considerable value and 
it is very difficult to counsel with complete objectivity. 
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 The interpretive model. In this mode the doctor provides information and aids the 
patient’s self-understanding.  She (the doctor) helps the patient clarify and then integrate 
the patient’s own values into the decision, while being careful not to impose her own 
values.  
 The deliberative model. This model is similar to the interpretive model “in that it includes 
a discussion of not only the medical benefits and risks, but also the patient’s individual 
priorities values and fears”.  Where it goes beyond the previous model is that “the 
physician must consciously communicate to the patient his or her health values” (ACOG, 
2004).  This must be done without pressurising the patient, thereby maintaining a balance 
of power in the doctor-patient relationship. 
 
Within the counselling scenario the doctor must judge whether the information presented is 
adequate.  Beauchamp and Childress state that a grasp of the relevant central facts is generally 
sufficient (2009:127).  In the practice of “evidence-based medicine” the strongest evidence must 
be utilised but where strong evidence is lacking, this must be honestly acknowledged.  “There is 
no ethical imperative to initiate discussion of treatment options that are unproven” (ACOG, 
2004). In addition doctors must guard against personal conflicts of interest such as the financial 
gain sometimes associated with innovative treatment techniques.  When looking at the broad 
picture, surgical and medical guidance in obstetrics is based in part on scientific evidence, in part 
on the doctor’s understanding of a patient’s values and preferences and in part on the experience 
and values of the doctor (ACOG, 2004).   With regard to a patient’s values and preferences, 
medical professionals ought to be attuned to what individual patients deem as important in their 
lives.  Olthuis and colleagues believe that this facilitates “good and caring” medical decisions that 
take into account the “lived experience of being ill” (2014).   
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6.2 Resuscitation of new-born babies 
 
Resuscitation of new-born babies occurs every day in the labour wards of hospitals.  In most 
cases the practice is well accepted and rests on a firm scientific basis, but there are difficult cases 
too.  “It is widely believed in neonatology and obstetrics that there are situations in which it is 
inappropriate to attempt new-born resuscitation, and other times when new-born resuscitation is 
obligatory despite parental refusal.  In each case an ethical justification for the decision needs to 
be identified” (Mercurio, 2009).  When resuscitation is performed, the goal or intent is to save the 
infant’s life and to minimise morbidity but when resuscitation is not performed the goal is to 
provide as peaceful a death as possible for the baby while providing emotional support for the 
parents.    There seem to be three positions regarding resuscitation. 
 Always resuscitate – this avoids a difficult ethical decision. 
 Always allow the parents to decide – this seems to avoid a difficult ethical decision. 
 Doctors must exercise judgement – this requires a difficult ethical decision. 
Decisions made in these circumstances are fraught with personal, conceptual and ethical 
difficulties (Kluge, 2012:274). 
 Personal difficulties include the psychological responses of parents as well as doctors who 
are trained to save and not to “let die”.  
 Conceptual difficulties include notions of disability, suffering and quality of life. 
 Examples of ethical questions are: who makes the decision, or, is there a difference 
between withholding and withdrawing care? 
 
   
In philosophy concepts are used to identify and classify our fields of experience.  Using class 
characteristics we recognise different types within the same concept.  Concrete concepts such as 
bird or building are not controversial.  On the other hand, abstract concepts such as those 
mentioned in bullet two above, are more difficult to deal with and often “represent matters and 
values that are of the gravest importance for people”.  We use ideas to interpret our fields of 
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experience which is clearly different to identification and classification.  Through interpretation 
we establish the value, importance and relevance of the things we encounter (Van Niekerk, 
2011:8).  Over time, certain ideas may become clear enough to become institutionalised as is the 
case with professional boards (Hall, 2013).  For example the American Academy of Pediatrics 
(AAP) acknowledges that there are circumstances in which resuscitation at birth can be withheld: 
Where gestation, birth weight, and/or congenital anomalies are associated with 
almost certain early death, and unacceptably high morbidity is likely among the rare 
survivors, resuscitation is not indicated, although exceptions may be appropriate in 
specific cases to comply with parental request. Examples include….  In conditions 
associated with uncertain prognosis, where there is borderline survival and a 
relatively high rate of morbidity, and where the burden to the child is high, some 
parents will request that no attempt be made to resuscitate the baby. In such cases, 
the parent’s views on either initiating or withholding resuscitation should be 
supported (Katwinkel, 2006). 
The basic principle is this: when early death is very likely and survival would be accompanied by 
unacceptably severe morbidity, resuscitation and intensive care are not indicated. When survival 
is likely and the risk of severe morbidity is low, resuscitation and intensive care are indicated.  
For cases that fall between these two positions, the parents should determine the treatment based 
on the child’s best interests.  The latter represents a consequentialist calculation of benefits over 
burdens (Mercurio, 2009). This still leaves the evaluation of the chance of survival and the 
interpretation of “unacceptably severe morbidity” to the doctor. 
 
Just how do doctors decide which extremely premature new-born babies to resuscitate? A general 
answer might be: when there is a net benefit that does not represent an injustice to others.  My 
approach to this question is to use the two components that I have advocated throughout this 
thesis.  First, understanding the relevant data and second, applying ethical reasoning.  Regarding 
the first point, I have given a summary of the data in section 6.1.  In addition to gestational age at 
birth, there are several factors that determine the survival and neurocognitive outcome of a baby.  
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These include, growth and birth weight, gender, whether antenatal corticosteroids were 
administered and single versus multiple pregnancy.  All of these confounding variables must be 
integrated into the decision by the doctor.  However, even if objective disability could be 
accurately predicted for an individual case, it is far more difficult to predict the “subjective 
perception of that disability by the parents, and most importantly by the child herself” (Mercurio, 
2009).  Saigal et al., have found that doctors have a worse perception of quality of life for those 
with severe disability than adolescents, parents of extremely low birth weight infants or parents 
from the community (1996).  This illustrates the point that we need the personal perspectives of 
persons with disabilities and should avoid imposing our own values. 
 
Rights of the new-born baby 
In section 3.2 I noted that whereas the rights of the fetus are limited, the new-born baby does 
have rights that must be taken into account.  There is almost universal consensus that newborn 
babies have clear moral and legal status although Goss has stated that “how absolute such status 
is, differs globally” (2002).  The South African Bill of Rights (Chapter 2 of the South African 
Constitution) states in 28(1)c that “Every child has the right to … basic health care services” 
(1996).  Although this concept is not further specified it should be noted that in 1995 South 
Africa ratified the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child.   This Convention 
recognises the rights and best interests of all children, including the right to life, optimal survival 
and development (Unicef 1989).  As always, each right is not absolute and must be weighed 
against others when taking a decision but such basic rights would include the following: 
 The “unalienable right” to life.  With the right to life comes a right to basic medical 
treatment to preserve life. 
 The right to mercy.  In the case of the new-born baby this is the right not to be subjected 
to pain that is unlikely to yield a net benefit.  Adults clearly have this right and new-born 
babies should be accorded it as well. 
 The right to justice.  Patients should be treated fairly and equally unless there is a morally 
relevant difference between them.  In a study using qualitative analysis to examine factors 
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that influence obstetric decision making at the threshold of viability, Edmonds et al., 
found that thresholds varied and that doctors managed in vitro fertilisation pregnancies 
more aggressively (2012).  Expressing similar concern regarding unjust, unequal 
treatment Janvier et al., found a greater willingness to withhold resuscitation from 
premature new-borns than from other people such as term new-borns, older children and 
adults (2008).  Although it may be argued from a psychological perspective that a deeper 
relationship exists with an older child than with a new-born baby, it is not evident whether 
this difference is morally relevant (Mercurio, 2009). 
 
Rights of the parents 
Parents have a right to be informed of their baby’s condition, prognosis and reasonable 
therapeutic options available (Mercurio, 2009).  This right does not depend on their intellectual 
capacity.  However, the right of a parent to decide is not absolute; it can be limited by the right of 
the child.  For example an adult can refuse recommended treatment for herself on religious 
grounds (Jehovah’s Witness) but does not have the right to deny her child  a treatment that is 
likely to prevent serious harm, suffering or death (Beauchamp, 2003:269-274; McQuoid-Mason, 
2005:29-30).  The United States Supreme court stated a long time ago that “parents have a right 
to make martyrs of themselves, but not of their children” (Massachusetts, 1944).  The general 
position is that when the baby’s best interests are unclear, then parents have the right to decide 
whether resuscitation is attempted or not.  However, beyond a threshold when the likelihood of 
benefit becomes high enough, treatment becomes obligatory (Mercurio, 2009).  Chervenak and 
McCullough put it this way: “When the fetus is a patient and the evidence for obstetric 
management for fetal and neonatal benefit is reliable, counselling of the pregnant woman is 
justifiably directive” (2102). 
 
Parents do not have the right to demand a treatment (in this case resuscitation), and doctors have 
no obligation to provide that treatment when it offers no benefit to the new-born baby.  In these 
circumstances the parental right to decide is outweighed by the baby’s right to mercy and the 
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doctor’s obligation not to inflict pain without benefit (non-maleficence) (Mercurio, 2009).  In 
another qualitative study, this time assessing parent’s experiences and satisfaction with care 
during the birth of their very preterm babies, Sawyer et al., identified the importance of staff 
appearing calm, portraying confidence and taking control during the birth process (Sawyer, 
2013).  In essence the parents in that study seemed happy to relinquish some autonomy for 
medical paternalistic direction in an existential crisis.  I now refer back to the four models 
(section 6.1, 82-83).  The environment where the decision on delivery and resuscitation of 
extremely preterm babies is made is highly stressful for some parents and overwhelming for 
others.  These parents have a right to guidance that is more than an informative menu of choices.  
As illustrated by Sawyer et al., when patient autonomy is impaired, a paternalistic approach may 
be the best way to balance the ethical principles.  However under these circumstances it is 
important for the parents to know when the presentation of the data is complete and when the 
presentation of the doctor’s opinion has begun (Mercurio, 2009). 
 
Withholding and withdrawing treatments 
At one time the action of removing a patient from a ventilator, thereby allowing him to die was 
unacceptable.  This meant that there was a great reluctance to begin ventilation in unclear cases.  
Currently, the opinion of Beauchamp and Childress is that the distinction between withholding 
and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is “outmoded and untenable” and sometimes even 
“morally dangerous” (2009:155).  There is a psychological problem in that stopping ventilation 
can be more difficult as emotional attachment to a baby grows each day. Doctors and parents may 
believe that this action renders them responsible for the baby’s death, whereas they are “not 
responsible” if life-sustaining treatment was not initiated and a “natural” death occurred.  
However the intent behind not performing resuscitation and stopping ventilation is to bring about 
the death of the baby and so the distinction, though perhaps psychologically comforting becomes 
morally irrelevant.  Wilkinson and Savulescu support this position stating that “Ethical analyses, 
professional guidelines and legal decisions support the equivalence thesis for life-sustaining 
treatment: if it is ethical to withhold treatment, it would be ethical to withdraw the same 
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treatment” (2012).  In practice limited resources have been used as a justification for withholding 
treatment but the above-mentioned authors believe that the same reason (resource allocation) 
plays a much smaller role when withdrawal of treatment is considered.  Reasons given by 
Wilkinson and Savulescu (2012) for this latter position include: 
 Fairness. Here doctors act on the basis of the “first come, first served” rule which is 
endorsed by some medical societies as a fair manner of distributing intensive care (Persad 
et al., 2009). 
 Conflict of interest.  Doctors have a relationship with their existing patients and their 
families.  This makes it difficult to choose between their patients and the prognosis of 
others with whom they do not yet have a professional relationship, but who are competing 
for the same scarce resource. 
 The slippery slope.  The concern here is that treatment withdrawal for justified reasons 
might pave the way for treatment withdrawal for morally unjustified reasons in the future. 
 Consent.  When treatment withdrawal is contemplated, potentially difficult consultation 
with families and consent is required.  This does not apply when requests for intensive 
care admission from doctors working outside the intensive care unit (ICU) are made to 
doctors managing the ICU.  The decisions are made between the doctors themselves. 
 Legal vulnerability.  Doctors may feel more vulnerable to legal sanction upon 
withdrawing treatment than when treatment is withheld. 
 
Brown et al., have investigated whether professional orientation of obstetric and paediatric 
specialists towards fetuses and pregnant women differs. Their findings suggested divergent 
ethical sensitivities with paediatric specialist having more optimistic attitudes (2012).  Upon 
reflection there is moral justification for withholding resuscitation at birth, and performing it but 
later withdrawing life-sustaining treatment such as ventilation.  However, there are two situations 
that we want to avoid. 
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 In withholding resuscitation in uncertain cases, a baby who might have survived with 
what the parents or child would perceive as a good outcome, will die.  This is an 
irreversible decision. 
 Providing resuscitation at birth, followed by ventilation might initially save a baby that 
subsequently dies after a painful course in the intensive care unit. The baby’s right to 
mercy is thereby violated. There are also the dangers of overtreatment, consumption of 
scarce resources and survival with profound impairment which the parents and/or child 
would consider unacceptable. 
Providing resuscitation and ventilation in borderline cases, does have advantages.  It avoids 
hurried decisions at a time of great stress, allows time for more prognostic indicators to be 
assessed, while some parents take comfort in having tried and then withdrawn support, than never 
having tried at all.  Indeed, the moral burden of proof seems heavier when the decision is to 
withhold, than when it is to withdraw treatment.  Beauchamp and Childress have proposed 
moving away from the morally irrelevant distinction between withholding and withdrawing 
treatment to the concept of optional and obligatory treatments (2009:166).  These categories are: 
I. Obligatory to treat (wrong not to treat) 
II. Obligatory not to treat (wrong to treat) 
III. Optional whether to treat (neither required nor prohibited – morally neutral). 
These categories can be superimposed on our clinical scenario. 
I. Deferring all decisions regarding resuscitation of the baby to the parents “is inconsistent 
with professional obligations to act as moral agents” (Mercurio, 2009).  Beyond an upper 
threshold (with a good chance of intact survival) it is wrong to withhold resuscitation 
even if the parents request this.  In this scenario Chervenak and McCullough state that 
directive counselling for resuscitation is ethically justified (2013). The baby’s right to life 
prevails over a parent’s right to decide.  The position of this upper threshold is influenced 
by many variables, but in moderately resourced tertiary settings it lies around 26 weeks’ 
gestation. 
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II. Below some threshold the chance of survival is so low that the baby’s right to mercy 
prevails over a parent’s right to decide.  Here, Chervenak and McCullough state that 
directive counselling for withholding resuscitation is ethically justified (2013). In 
moderately resourced tertiary settings this lower threshold lies below 24 weeks’ gestation. 
III. Between categories I & II there is an area of uncertainty.  This is where the will of 
informed parents should direct the doctor after non-directive counselling. 
I must repeat that the thresholds are not “cast in stone” but are open to revision.  Maternal-fetal 
subspecialists and neonatologists at a facility should determine them by consensus, through 
understanding the relevant data and ethics issues.  Once decided upon, the approach must be 
applied consistently. 
 
 
 
 
6.3 Normality and impairment in an era of enhancement 
 
The birth of a baby should be a joyous event but sometimes it can be a tragedy.  In the 
pregnancy-related condition of pre-eclampsia, delivery is often necessary at or just beyond the 
threshold of viability, raising the possibility of survivors with major and minor impairments.  On 
the other hand we live in an era of enhancement when e.g. screening and diagnostic tests for 
genetic conditions with cognitive impairment such as Down’s syndrome have become a routine 
part of antenatal care in many countries.  Once the diagnosis of Down’s syndrome is confirmed 
termination of pregnancy is considered. Where does the balance between accepting impairment 
and trying to eliminate it, lie?  
 
Using the moral principles that undergird modern medical practice, it is not difficult to support 
opportunities of making less-than-normal children normal, but should we go further?  Is society 
becoming less tolerant of children and adults with neurocognitive impairment?  Rosemarie Tong, 
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a philosopher from North America, believes that “although parents have a limited right to 
enhance their already normal children genetically, and, conceivably, also a limited duty to do so, 
they should not be encouraged to do so (2002:88).  Indeed, society should actively discourage 
parent’s quests and expectations of perfect babies rather than imperfect mortals to love as ends in 
themselves (Chervenak et al., 2010; Alderson, 2002:210). In a study designed to test whether 
there are differences in the level of maternal-fetal attachment (early affection) before and after 
fetal imaging echocardiography which is used to investigate cardiac abnormalities, Ruschel et al., 
concluded that diagnosis of fetal heart disease increases the level of maternal-fetal attachment 
(2014). 
 
The most recent Federation of International Gynecology and Obstetrics (FIGO) Committee 
Report on “Ethical issues in the management of severe congenital anomalies” (includes all forms 
of impairment from birth) emphasizes that anomalies range from insignificant to severe.  The 
document acknowledges the lack of a medical definition of both severity of fetal disease and 
normal life (2013:307).  Indeed, the very notion of normal is often regarded by disabled persons 
as a form of discrimination.  Using qualitative research methods among disabled persons, 
Priscilla Alderson found that they suffered more from the general stigma of disability than from 
their actual condition (2002:206).  However she only included persons with the ability to be 
interviewed.  Most of these appeared to value and enjoy their lives. When examined from the 
important perspective of the affected child and its parents, Bennett and Harris find nothing 
morally wrong with “bringing into existence” an impaired but worthwhile life (2002:323).   I 
agree with this position and have discussed the pertinent ethical issues in section 2.2 (36-37). 
 
Returning to the FIGO document, it further states that delivering and raising a severely impaired 
baby may impact on the physical, mental and social life of a family (2013:307).  There is also the 
not inconsiderable financial cost of caring for an impaired child or adult.  Where families cannot 
afford the cost themselves, these would have to be carried by the state.  This would hardly satisfy 
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utilitarian or libertarian perspectives but communitarian and specifically egalitarian theories of 
justice would seek to address, and if possible correct unjustified, arbitrary impairments.  
There are those who argue that selecting who may survive and utilise society’s resources 
devalues disabled persons and inappropriately sets the standards that must be met in order to 
count as a person (Kluge, 2012:279).  “This approach deprives society of the opportunity to 
develop virtues such as compassion, tolerance and understanding, and thereby impoverishes the 
moral life of society in general (Ashley & O’Rourke, 1982).  It is my opinion that even in an era 
of enhancement, we have no obligation to “eradicate” unavoidable impairment, although doctors 
and patients must always seek to prevent it.  We may reasonably ask what price society will pay 
if it does not protect its weakest members who cannot help themselves. 
 
6.4 Summary position 
 
In this chapter I have discussed counselling in yet another pre-eclampsia scenario, resuscitation 
of an extremely preterm new-born baby and asked whether we have devalued impaired children 
in an era of enhancement.  The modes or models of counselling are further refined by placing 
pragmatically flexible interpretive and deliberative models between the less frequently applicable 
paternalistic and informative models. The environment where the decision on delivery and 
resuscitation of extremely preterm babies is made is highly stressful for some parents and 
overwhelming for others.  These parents have a right to guidance that is more than an informative 
menu of choices.  Under these circumstances the paternalistic model becomes the best method of 
balancing the ethical principles.  The distinction between withholding resuscitation from the 
extremely premature new-born baby and initiating but later withdrawing care is morally 
irrelevant.  Using the categories of optional and obligatory treatments is more helpful but 
maternal-fetal subspecialists and neonatologists need to determine treatment thresholds through 
understanding the relevant data and ethics issues.  Modern society is pursing enhancement while 
at the same time grappling with the position of impaired persons.  My conviction is that impaired 
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persons offer society the opportunity to develop virtues such as compassion, tolerance and 
understanding, and thereby deepen its moral life.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SOMATIC SUPPORT AFTER MATERNAL BRAIN DEATH 
 
7.1 Background 
 
The moral character of medicine is based on three values central to the doctor-patient 
relationship.  They are: 
 Patient benefit. Care is provided where benefits outweigh burdens or harms.  Doctors 
have no obligation to continue treatment where it is their clear, professional opinion that 
such treatment would provide no clinical benefit (Chan & Tipoe, 2014). 
 Patient self-determination.  In an environment of individual autonomy, professional 
counselling enables the mutual identification of the operative goals of care.  The patient 
has a right to control what happens to her body and treatment may not be administered 
without her consent.  Treatment goals may change according to the considered choice of 
the patient or an appropriate surrogate decision maker.  
 Ethical integrity of the health care professional.  Doctors too are autonomous agents and 
may not be compelled to violate personal ethical or religious values in the service of the 
patient.  Doctors have a moral commitment to avoid risks to the patient that are greater 
than the potential benefits and are therefore not obliged to provide untested, medically 
contra-indicated or futile treatments (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009; Pellegrino & 
Thomasma, 1988). 
 
The practice of obstetrics involves different types of care ranging from preventative care to 
medical and surgical interventions, and even to palliative care for patients whose illnesses offer 
no chance of cure. Each type of care is linked to definable goals including the relief of symptoms, 
pain and suffering, and the optimisation of pregnancy outcomes.  I have already explained how 
the goals are identified through counselling and shared decision making between the patient and 
her doctor.  These goals must be clear for the following reasons. 
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 Assumptions about the objectives of care inevitably shape perceptions about the 
appropriate course of treatment. 
 These objectives may be understood differently by the patient and her caregivers. 
 Unarticulated commitments to certain goals may lead to misunderstanding and conflict. 
 The goals of care may evolve and change in response to clinical and other factors 
(ACOG, 2004).  
 
In this chapter the focus falls on the palliative and comfort care of the pregnant woman and the 
interests of her fetus.  Women do not lose their rights when they become pregnant or terminally 
ill (van Bogaert & Dhai, 2008).  In 1772 John Gregory stated that “it is as much the business of a 
physician….to alleviate pain, and to smooth the avenues of death as to cure diseases” (Pernick, 
1983).  In end-of-life decision making, obstetricians must attempt to follow the wishes of their 
pregnant patients, or appropriate surrogate decision makers when the patient is no longer able to 
make her own decisions.  Somatic support refers to the continuation of measures to support the 
respiratory and circulatory functions of the patient and to provide nutrition.  
 
7.2 Maternal brain death and perimortem caesarean section 
 
In section 5.3 I have argued that a pregnant woman with decision making capacity has the same 
right to refuse treatment as a non-pregnant woman.  Although she did not suffer from pre-
eclampsia, the case of Angela Carder in the United States, in 1987 had a major influence in this 
area of obstetric management.  When medical complications occur, a pregnant woman may lose 
her decision making capacity, either temporarily or permanently.  In pre-eclampsia/eclampsia, 
major cerebral complications such as intra-cerebral haemorrhage or massive cerebral oedema 
occur regularly in South Africa (Saving Mothers, 2008-2010).  These complications cause 
maternal collapse that may be rapidly followed by death.  However, with improved resuscitation 
techniques, patients are sometimes saved and transferred to intensive care units (ICU) where 
advanced support and further evaluation is possible.  Unfortunately, a subsequent diagnosis of 
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brain death is made in certain cases.  Once a patient is mentally incapacitated, medical decisions 
must be taken by a surrogate decision maker.  The usual order of priority for determining this 
person is: a legally appointed person with power of attorney, spouse, an adult child of the patient, 
either parent of the patient, adult brother or sister of the patient or adult close friend of the patient 
(DiGiovanni, 2010).  The surrogate decision maker is required to participate in formulating 
explicit care giving goals for the patient and her fetus.  According to Beauchamp and Childress 
there are three standards that surrogate decision makers may use. 
 The substituted judgement standard.  The aim here is to make the decision the 
incompetent person would have made if competent. 
 The pure autonomy standard.  This standard compels us to respect the preferences of 
formerly autonomous patients but in the absence of explicit instructions the proxy may 
choose selectively. 
 The best interest standard.  Here the highest net benefit among the available options is 
chosen, and may even override advance directives and refusal by incompetent patients.  
This is the best standard for previously competent or never competent patients 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:139). 
 
With the broader acceptance of the “fetus as a patient” principle (section 3.2) consideration has 
been given to extending somatic support to the brain dead mother, usually in an ICU setting in 
order to improve the outcome of the fetus/baby.  Different scenarios are illustrated by the 
following four adapted cases. 
 
Case 6: A 20-year-old, woman in her second pregnancy was referred to a tertiary 
hospital after being diagnosed with pre-eclampsia and suffering acute collapse at 34 
weeks’ gestation.  Special investigations revealed a large intra-cerebral 
haemorrhage and brain death was subsequently diagnosed. After consultation with 
the family a caesarean section was performed and a live, stable baby delivered. 
Thereafter ventilation was withdrawn and the mother demised.  
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Case 7: (not pre-eclampsia) A 28-year-old, woman in her third pregnancy was 
referred to a tertiary hospital with stridor (obstructed respiration at the level of the 
larynx) of unknown aetiology.  She was 25 weeks pregnant. A tracheostomy 
procedure was performed but two days later she developed exsanguinating 
haemorrhage from the surgical site.  In order to assist a difficult resuscitation, a 
perimortem “caesarean section” was performed but the mother and fetus both 
demised. 
Case 8: A 27-year-old, woman in her second pregnancy developed eclampsia (pre-
eclampsia complicated by generalised convulsions) at 31 weeks’ gestation. She was 
stabilised at a Community Health Centre, intubated and referred to a tertiary 
hospital where she was subsequently declared brain dead due to a massive intra-
cerebral haemorrhage.  The family was counselled regarding the mother’s condition 
and they accepted her inevitable death.  From their side there was no wish to deliver 
a premature baby who might have suffered significant brain damage while the 
mother was hypoxemic.  Advanced support was withdrawn and the mother demised 
with her baby in utero. 
Case 9: A 22-year-old, woman in her second pregnancy was referred to a tertiary 
hospital with severe pre-eclampsia at 28 weeks’ gestation.  She required intubation 
due to her depressed level of consciousness.  After appropriate investigation in the 
Intensive Care Unit she was declared brain dead. In consultation with the family a 
decision was taken to optimise and then deliver the baby. The plan was to administer 
corticosteroids (to enhance fetal pulmonary maturity); gain one week of maturation 
in utero for the baby, while providing somatic support to the brain dead mother and 
then to deliver by caesarean section.  Five days later, heart rate monitoring of the 
baby showed signs of distress and delivery of a live baby was performed by 
caesarean section.  After the operation maternal support was withdrawn and the 
mother demised. 
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For most pregnant women and their families, the welfare of the fetus is of the utmost concern.  
This maternal interest in the welfare of her fetus forms the basis of the fundamental ethical 
commitment of the obstetrician (ACOG, 2004).  The obstetrician is responsible for both the 
patient and her fetus and must optimise benefits and minimise risks for both parties.  When a 
pregnant woman is dying or is brain dead, the International Federation of Gynecology and 
Obstetrics (FIGO) affirms that the life and well-being of the fetus becomes a matter of urgent 
consideration (FIGO, 2006).  Excruciating choices have to be made that respect the woman’s 
recent and clearly expressed wishes and incorporate the views of the woman’s partner and family 
who will need to care for the baby.  In sections 7.1 and 7.2, I have emphasised the importance of 
the patient-doctor relationship, or in the case of brain death, surrogate/proxy-doctor relationship 
in setting clearly understood goals.  I have also explained how the decision making process of the 
surrogate should be informed.   
 
Perimortem caesarean section and resuscitation 
During cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) with the pregnant woman lying on her back, chest 
compression does not deliver sufficient cardiac output to accomplish resuscitation (Katz, 2012).  
Therefore when a mother has a resuscitatable cause of death, her life might be saved by prompt 
(four minutes after collapse) delivery of the fetus (Katz, 2012; Einav et al., 2012).  This is 
performed primarily to save the mother but in the process (rule of double effect, see section 3.3) 
the life of the baby might be saved as well.  In Case 7, the perimortem caesarean section was 
performed in the acute scenario as part of the resuscitation effort to save the mother, not to save 
the previable fetus. 
 
When a woman who has collapsed medically, is successfully resuscitated with her fetus still alive 
in utero, difficult choices have to be made.  “During initial management of a pregnant woman 
with evolving brain death, it must be decided whether to deliver the fetus immediately, to initiate 
supportive care to allow further fetal maturation, or to allow the fetus to die as the mother is 
removed from mechanical ventilation” (Powner & Bernstein 2003).  When the gestational age is 
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compatible with a good outcome, immediate delivery is preferred but for the fetus at the 
threshold of viability, prolonging the gestation to optimise neonatal outcome may be considered 
while the mother is stable. 
 
In the case of maternal brain death, extended somatic support has been provided for > 100 days 
for the sake of the fetus alone (Powner & Bernstein, 2003) but with pre-eclampsia it is unlikely 
that the mother would remain “stable” for that length of time even in an ICU setting.  
Haemodynamic instability and organ failure poses challenges to maintaining adequate utero-
placental blood flow.  A bed in an ICU is an expensive, extra-ordinary and scarce resource, 
particularly in developing countries.  The growing demand for ICU services requires continuous 
triage of the adults and children most likely to benefit from such care, raising another set of 
ethical dilemmas (Levin & Sprung, 2008).  When the prognosis of the mother is not considered, 
as in the case of brain death, it is the fetus, who has no legal rights and whose right to life is a 
matter of ethical debate that is effectively competing with rights-bearing adults and children for 
an ICU bed.  Nonetheless, even when the pregnant woman is brain dead with no cognitive 
function and no prospect of recovery (dead in strict legal terms – Lane et al., 2004), her body is 
still biologically alive, and must be treated with respect and her right to die with dignity or in 
peace, not forgotten.  Although the disputable phrase “best interests” is often used to motivate the 
right to die with dignity Chan and Tipoe believe that one can easily reach the same decision by 
considering the futility of treatment only (2012).  The question that I want to answer is whether it 
is ethically appropriate to provide maternal organ supportive measures (somatic support) to 
optimise the fetal outcome in a case of maternal brain death. 
 
Prolongation of maternal somatic function is being described more frequently but it still 
constitutes experimental care (Lane et al., 2004).  As such, doctors are not under an obligation to 
offer or provide it (see section 7.1).  The gestational age of the fetus is central to the argument.  In 
Chapters 4 & 6, I made the point that a gain of 2-7 days in utero can be critical for the neonatal 
outcome when delivery is effected around the threshold of viability.  In Case 6 the gestational age 
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was already relatively advanced (34 weeks) and so extended support was rightly not considered.  
In Case 8, the family accepted the death of the mother and chose not to save a possibly 
compromised but viable fetus, while in Case 9 the family accepted the death of the mother but 
wanted the fetus to have the best possible chance of survival.  I would argue that the decision to 
extend somatic support to a brain dead pregnant woman can be supported ethically provided that 
the fetus is at the threshold of viability, the support is not prolonged (issues of distributive 
justice), advanced level (ICU) support is available with a successful outcome likely, and finally 
that the doctors and family are in clear agreement as to the goals. 
 
 
7.3 Summary position 
 
Women do not lose their rights when they become pregnant or terminally ill.  When a woman 
who has suffered major complications of pre-eclampsia before delivery is subsequently declared 
brain dead, her doctors and family must formulate clear plans for the dying mother and her living 
fetus.  Although she may be regarded as dead in strict legal terms, the patient’s body is still 
biologically alive, and must be treated with respect and her right to die with dignity not forgotten.  
The decision to extend somatic support to a brain dead pregnant woman in order to optimise the 
outcome of her fetus/baby can be supported ethically provided that the fetus is at the threshold of 
viability, the support is not prolonged (issues of distributive justice), advanced level (ICU) 
support is available with a successful outcome likely, and finally that the doctors and family are 
in clear agreement as to the goals. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT:  LIMITED CHOICE OF ANTI-HYPERTENSIVE MEDICATIONS 
 
8.1 Background 
 
Obstetricians face the challenge of knowing how best to prevent or treat illnesses in their 
pregnant patients on a daily basis.  This is a challenge because of a chronic reluctance to conduct 
research in pregnant women resulting in inadequate data to guide many treatment decisions.  By 
way of example “The global H1N1 influenza pandemic disproportionately affected pregnant 
women, drawing attention to the fact that although they need safe and effective medical 
treatment, they have always been a marginalised study population” (Goldkind et al., 2010).  
During the 2009/10 H1N1 influenza pandemic pregnant women suffered higher morbidity and 
mortality than the general population.  It is well known that the physiology of pregnant women 
differs from that of non-pregnant women and men.  This begs the question whether the correct 
antiviral agent was prescribed to those pregnant women, and if so was it prescribed at the correct, 
effective dose, to meet their particular medical needs? 
 
In section 1.1, I highlighted the importance of pre-eclampsia and other hypertensive diseases of 
pregnancy.  Hypertension and specifically acute severe hypertension are dangerous conditions 
that require definitive medical treatment (Hall et al., 2000b).  While some of the largest research 
trials in recent medical history have involved anti-hypertensive agents, very few have been 
conducted amongst pregnant women, thereby severely limiting the choice of obstetricians or 
forcing them to adopt “off label/licence” prescription practices (Expert Opinion, 2007).  This 
means that the prescription e.g. of an anti-hypertensive agent takes place outside the indications 
for which that agent/drug was registered, placing greater responsibility on the prescribing doctor.  
With regard to anti-hypertensive medications in pregnancy, progress has been extremely slow.  
Methyl-dopa, an “old” drug is still widely used because research performed during pregnancy 
does exist and there are follow-up data showing no short-or long-term problems in children 
followed to the age of 7 years, following in utero exposure (Redman et al., 2010:173).  However 
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methyl-dopa has poor potency and causes side effects to the mother.  It is therefore hardly ever 
used outside of pregnancy because better agents are available.  Although no one doubts the 
importance of preventing harm to pregnant women, their fetuses and future children there are 
sound arguments to “justify the inclusion of pregnant women in a greater number of biomedical 
studies” than is currently the case (Macklin, 2010). 
 
8.2 Lack of research in pregnant women 
 
The reluctance to include pregnant women in clinical research follows from medical disasters and 
lawsuits such as that with thalidomide, a mild anti-emetic that was never tested in pregnancy and 
resulted in the birth of around 10 000 babies with severely deformed limbs after their mothers 
had used the medication for “morning sickness”.    The general result of this and other similar 
disasters is aptly summarised by Lyerly et al.  “Due to ethical complexities and concerns about 
research risks, pregnant women and their interests have been under-represented in research.  A 
consequence has been a dearth of information about the safety and appropriate dosing of 
medications and vaccines during pregnancy and a limited understanding of how illness during 
pregnancy affects women’s health over time” (Lyerly et al., 2012).  In the 1970s and 1980s the 
prevalent attitude was to exclude women of childbearing potential and pregnant women from 
research (ACOG, 2004).  This was due to the following reasons: 
 Fear that an undiagnosed pregnancy might place an embryo at risk. 
 Fear that a fetus would be harmed in a known pregnancy. 
 The view that pregnant women are vulnerable and require protection. 
 Fear that the liability risk would be increased.  This fear affects Institutional Review 
Boards and drug manufacturers (ACOG, 2004).  
However what is ethically acceptable often changes over time.  In properly conducted trials the 
risk of harms can be minimised.  Thus the existence of risk in itself, does not justify the exclusion 
of women from the research needed to provide valid evidence for treatment.   Recently there have 
been many calls for greater inclusion of pregnant women in clinical trials in order to obtain valid, 
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evidence-based rather than empirical information, applicable to this population (ACOG, 2004; 
Macklin, 2010).  This information is needed to fill in the “gaps” in medical knowledge needed to 
treat common conditions encountered during pregnancy, such as hypertension. According to 
Macklin, “an evolution in ethical thinking has undeniably occurred” (2010).  Despite the current 
calls for greater inclusion, there are those who argue that the exclusion of pregnant women from 
clinical trials is not automatic, not unethical, nor arbitrarily determined (Allesee &Gallagher, 
2011).  Commenting on the situation in the United States, the latter authors state that the current 
regulatory framework is “based on sound ethical and legal reasoning that  demonstrates when 
inclusion is appropriate or when clear and compelling reasons for exclusion” exist (Allesee & 
Gallagher, 2011).  The position of the South African, Department of Health, Research Ethics 
Guidelines is that “no pregnant woman may be involved as a participant in any research activity 
unless the purpose of the activity is to meet the health needs of the mother, and the foetus will be 
placed at risk only to the minimum extent necessary to meet such needs” (DOH, 2004).  A 
similarly worded statement applies to research involving fetuses.    
 
The rationale for specifically including pregnant women in research begins with the physiologic 
changes during pregnancy and lactation, which makes these women different from non-pregnant 
women and men.  Other factors include: 
 Medical conditions such as HIV, that frequently affect pregnant women. 
 Certain medical conditions such as pre-eclampsia that are specific to pregnancy.  
 Certain conditions such as preterm labour that threaten the course of pregnancy. 
 Certain conditions such as growth restriction that affect the fetus. 
 Medical conditions related to pregnancy that may affect the future health of women (see 
Chapter 9). 
 The safety of medication during pregnancy and breast feeding (ACOG, 2004). 
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What do women say? 
There is little evidence to explain why women agree or decline participation in research during 
pregnancy.  Lynn Jansen states that research participants “regularly overestimate the likelihood of 
gaining therapeutic benefit from a clinical trial”.  She believes that this “mistake” needs to be 
studied and informed consent re-evaluated (2014).  On the other hand, Lyerly et al., have recently 
reported on a small sample of pregnant women with high levels of education and socio-economic 
status who were participating in a National Institutes of Health, phase II, multicentre, randomised 
H1N1 vaccine trial.  These women “construed participation as a benefit rather than a risky 
endeavour from which they needed protection, and even articulated reasons that such 
participation is preferable to clinical care when pregnant” (2012).  Several women reported 
feeling safer as part of a research study, while others cited altruistic motivations for study 
participation.  The latter findings counter the entrenched view that pregnant women need 
protection from research, but although they are certainly helpful, they cannot simply be 
generalised to other populations or trials involving greater risks e.g. fetal surgery for spina bifida. 
 
What are the ethical requirements for research? 
For research on any human subject to be justified there needs to be a reasonable prospect of the 
acquisition of useful knowledge while maintaining a favourable balance of benefits over risks.  
Strategies for risk mitigation include first obtaining adequate preclinical information e.g. 
toxicology studies, and a safety database with information from non-pregnant women (Goldkind 
et al., 2010).  Macklin (2010), is of the opinion that it is also ethically necessary to first have data 
from animal studies before using human participants, a position supported by research ethics 
directives in South Africa (MRC, 2013).  Still, it is important to remember that animal studies do 
not always accurately predict results in humans.  In the case of thalidomide, had this mutagenic 
agent been taken through rigorous phase I or phase II clinical trials the effect would have been 
quickly discovered and the number of deformities much smaller.  This is easily understood from 
a utilitarian perspective.  Research subjects must be carefully monitored and protected and there 
must be a fair distribution of burdens and benefits among potential research subjects.  Doctors 
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who assume the dual roles of clinician and investigator must be particularly wary of conflict of 
interest because each role has different goals (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:139).  The goal of 
the investigator is to generate beneficial knowledge for the future, whilst the clinician must act in 
the best interests of the current patient.  The ACOG Committee on Ethics points out that the 
potential for role conflict is particularly apparent when innovative therapies are introduced 
(ACOG, 2004).   
 
What ethical principles support the inclusion of pregnant women in research? 
The call to include more pregnant women in clinical research is justified by the following ethical 
principles. 
 Autonomy. In civil society and medical practice women have the capacity and the right to 
make decisions regarding their own lives.  This includes the right to weigh the risks and 
benefits associated with participation in research projects and decide for themselves.  This 
autonomous right is however limited “by the right of investigators and Institutional 
Review Boards to take precautions to limit the risk for pregnant women and their fetuses” 
(ACOG, 2004:88).    Autonomy is applied through informed consent, which in research 
should meet the highest standards and be presented in understandable verbal and written 
language.  Participants need a careful explanation of the type of research protocol that 
they will be participating in e.g. how a randomised controlled trial is conducted.  The 
researcher and caregivers should guard against therapeutic misconception where 
participants/patients have inflated perceptions of therapeutic benefit. This is a particular 
danger when the patient’s doctor is also the researcher. Another limit on autonomy is 
when it infringes on the rights of others.  Some authors extend this “infringement 
argument” to the maternal-fetal relationship, arguing the decisions by the mother may 
infringe on the rights of her fetus (Allesee & Gallagher, 2011).  The maternal-fetal 
relationship has already been discussed.  In my opinion respect for the fetus may not 
come at the cost of the pregnant woman’s autonomy.  The interests of the fetus are better 
served by helping the pregnant woman to make a better informed decision.  Whether the 
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father of the pregnancy needs to be involved in the consent process for research is 
controversial.  For most research the consent of the pregnant woman alone is sufficient 
and the ACOG Committee on Ethics does not support recognition of distinct paternal 
rights before the birth of a child (2004).  The positions of the South African Medical 
Research Council (MRC) Guidelines on Ethics in Medical Research and the South 
African Department of Health (DOH) Research Ethics Guidelines, are similar to the 
ACOG in that paternal consent is not automatically necessary, but the ACOG and DOH 
guidelines do require maternal and paternal consent when research has the prospect of 
direct benefit to the fetus alone (ACOG, 2004; DOH, 2004; MRC, 2013).  In my opinion 
the South African position does need to take communitarian (Ubuntu) ethics into account 
(Hall et al., 2013).  The DOH and MRC documents limit paternal participation when the 
research activities are primarily directed towards the mother (DOH, 2004; MRC, 2013).  
The mother is encouraged only to involve the father of the pregnancy in making the 
decision.  Although it is only the signed, informed consent of the pregnant patient that is 
legally necessary to proceed when the health needs of the mother and fetus are involved, I 
would argue that time must be made by the woman (and if necessary by the researchers) 
to involve and seek the opinions of her partner and/or her family before official 
participation.  This approach allows the woman to determine the extent of paternal and 
family involvement in the consent process.  In a communitarian society, participation 
without such support only weakens the moral position of the participant and researchers, 
and often results in an “unexplained” withdrawal from the study.  While women do have 
the autonomous right to withdraw from a study at any time (MRC, 2013), this decision is 
often “made for them” through pressure by the community if sufficient prior consultation 
was lacking. 
 Beneficence.  Pregnant women can benefit from the valid results of research designed to 
provide specific answers to their health needs.   
 Non-maleficence.  Pregnant women may actually suffer harm when data from studies on 
men and/or non-pregnant women are extrapolated to them.  Systematic evaluation of risks 
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and benefits is particularly important when vulnerable populations are involved.  
According to the MRC Guidelines on Ethics in Medical Research, one the characteristics 
of a vulnerable community is the “limited availability of treatment options” (2013).  I 
have argued that this certainly applies to pregnant women. 
 Justice.  It is widely held that health care is a “special good” with a special need for a 
theory of justice (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:242).  In section 4.2, I discussed formal 
and material principles of justice. A dilemma with the principle of distributive justice is 
that it does not specify the characteristics of a “health need” or whose needs are more 
important but in the opinion of the ACOG “The systematic exclusion of women from 
research violates the ethical principle of justice, which first requires that persons be given 
what is due to them” (2004).  Pregnancy is a condition valued, even encouraged by 
society, and as such it may not become the basis of unjust denial of benefits according to 
the “fair opportunity” rule.  Justice requires that women do not have results from different 
study populations imposed on them.  Medical research may be viewed as a limited 
resource but the benefits of scientific advancement should be shared equally.  Thus 
researchers should be required to address obstacles to the participation of specific groups 
such as pregnant women.  Consideration must be given, not just to those who should 
benefit but also to those who bear the burden.  The Belmont Report advises that “medical 
research on any given group should not unduly affect persons from other groups unlikely 
to be among the beneficiaries of subsequent applications of research” (2010).  However, 
at a practical level, the economic considerations in the allocation of resources are difficult 
to ignore.  Clinical trials are generally expensive; the “market” of ill pregnant women is 
small and the risks of legal liability for pharmaceutical companies, high. 
 
Research versus post-marketing surveillance 
Although it is important to prevent harm to pregnant women, their fetuses and future children, it 
is debatable whether participation in research holds more risks than clinical care.  In fact, 
“because the evidence base for current treatments is so weak, standard practice can be more like 
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experiment than validated treatment” according to Lyerly et al., (2010).  The argument stating 
that despite the lack of clinical research, women are still protected by post-marketing surveillance 
is unconvincing.  Although official surveillance activities have value they lack the rigor of 
randomised or other carefully conducted scientific trials and control over post-marketing 
surveillance is more difficult due to the wider scope of activities and role players.  Advantages of 
properly conducted research include the following: 
 “The quality of informed consent including detailed information about risks and benefits 
will be better in the research setting than in the clinic when physicians prescribe a 
medication that has never been tested in pregnant women” (Macklin, 2010). 
 The participants/patients will be monitored more carefully. 
 Phase I and/or phase II trials will discover serious mutagenic effects quickly.  The 
numbers of pregnancies thus exposed to harm are far smaller than the numbers of 
exposures with post-marketing surveillance.  This makes good utilitarian sense. 
 
Despite the moral and clinical justifications for a greater participation of pregnant women in 
biomedical studies, support for this process would be irresponsible without having properly 
trained Institutional Review Boards and researchers practicing with rigorous ethical scrutiny.  
Biomedical research in developing countries must develop and/or maintain high standards and 
beware of the pervasive commercial influence of multi-national conglomerates.  In the South 
African context it is encouraging to note the recent comments by van Niekerk and Benatar who 
opine that “a lot of what is currently done in bioethics in South Africa deals with capacity 
building in research ethics, in particular capacity to participate in the ethical review of research 
protocols” (2011).  South Africa has a number of excellent research units that must continue to 
explore the deep reserve of opportunities present in clinical medicine in this country.  This 
includes involving pregnant women in clinical research. 
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8.3 Summary position 
 
The limited choice of anti-hypertensive agents for use in pregnant women can be viewed as a 
direct result of limited research studies involving pregnant women.  Although it is important to 
prevent harm to pregnant women, their fetuses and future children, it is debatable whether 
participation in research holds more risks than clinical care.  In addition ethical principles justify 
research in this group.   Researchers have several strategies for risk mitigation at their disposal 
and robust research protocols that are meticulously implemented provide security for the 
clinician/researcher and pregnant woman alike.  I therefore support the calls for increased 
representation of pregnant women and their interests in research, as the initiative is morally 
justified and will improve clinical management. 
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CHAPTER NINE:  PRE-ECLAMPSIA BEYOND PREGNANCY 
 
9.1 Mother and child 
 
In Chapter One I stated that pre-eclampsia is a pregnancy-specific disease that resolves after 
delivery of the placenta.  While this is still largely true, research during the last decade has shown 
that this disorder has lifelong implications for the mother, and her infant if it is born with a low 
birth weight (Pettit & Brown, 2012).  Pre-eclampsia and other hypertensive disorders are 
common complications of pregnancy.  Observational studies have now shown a relationship 
between these disorders and cardiovascular disease, renal disease, and diabetes later in life (Sattar 
& Greer, 2002; Pettit & Brown, 2012; Hermes et al., 2013).  This is important as cardiovascular 
disease and diabetes are leading causes of morbidity and mortality in women in developed 
countries.  Certain authors believe that pregnancy acts as a cardiovascular “stress test” by 
unmasking underlying pathology, while others have demonstrated that it may be the disease 
condition (pre-eclampsia) itself that begins the long-term pathological process (Pettit & Brown, 
2012; Bytautiene et al., 2013). With regard to children, Chan et al., investigated the effects of 
preterm birth and growth restriction (both common in pre-eclampsia) on cardiovascular, renal or 
metabolic dysfunction in adolescents.  Using a retrospective, cohort study design, they 
demonstrated that preterm birth and low birth weight increased the risk of arterial stiffness and 
metabolic dysfunction (2010). 
 
Whether pre-eclampsia is the cause or simply a disease that unmasks women with vulnerable 
vascular systems, it does provide an opportunity to identify women at increased risk of 
cardiovascular disease.  The next step will be to address the modifiable risk factors through 
lifestyle and medical interventions in order to prevent morbidity and mortality.  This would 
include regular exercise, cessation of smoking, prevention or management of obesity, as well as 
medical treatment of hypertension and metabolic dysfunction if required.  To date there are no 
properly structured studies that answer this question but doctors have a strong obligation to 
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advocate a healthy lifestyle for women who experienced hypertensive diseases during their 
pregnancies. 
 
9.2 Ethics in prevention and primary care 
 
When seeking to prevent disease we move into the domain of primary care within public health.  
Traditional bioethics teaching tends to emphasise the perplexing dilemmas usually encountered 
in hospitals and tertiary care settings.  In contrast to hospitals where staff appropriately trained in 
ethics, or even a clinical ethics committee are available to provide guidance, support in primary 
health care is sparser while the need for ethics support is probably no less (Lillemoen &  
Pedersen, 2012).  In fact ethical issues in primary care occur frequently and affect the quality of 
care.  A case in point here is the influencing of individuals to change their behaviour through 
lifestyle modification, in order to prevent cardiovascular morbidity and mortality.  Moon et al., 
state that “the complex nature of primary care can make it difficult to define a clear and 
consistent process for managing ethical conflicts” (2008:478).  Roberts and Reich agree that 
ethical dilemmas are regularly encountered in public health, citing the examples of influencing 
changes in patient behaviour, rationing scarce resources and limiting individual freedom to 
diminish disease transmission.  Their framework for analysing these dilemmas distinguishes three 
philosophical views “often invoked in public health discourse: positions based on outcomes 
(utilitarianism), positions focussed on rights and opportunities (liberalism), and views that 
emphasize character and virtue (communitarianism)” (Roberts & Reich, 2002). 
 
Many other philosophical views can also be distinguished in primary care.  The interconnected 
network of needs and care, as well as the prevention of harm are expressions of the “Ethics of 
Care” that originated in feminist writings (Hall et al., 2013).  The principle of beneficence directs 
that we should actively prevent harm from occurring to others (Beauchamp & Childress, 
2009:199).  While W.D. Ross had a wide and demanding interpretation of general beneficence 
that rested on the mere fact that “there are other beings in the world whose condition we can 
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make better” (Ross, 1930), this has been described as romantic, impractical and sometimes 
perilous because the “more widely we generalise obligations of beneficence, the less likely we 
will be to meet our primary responsibilities” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:199). Yet although 
common morality sets limits to the demands of beneficence, doctors have a specific duty to 
prevent disease and harm.  Apart from the moral obligations of care, the principle of beneficence 
requires doctors to balance costs, risks and benefits.  This is as applicable to primary care as it is 
to hospital care.  Statements of risk are evaluative as they attach a value to the prevention of 
events such as cardiovascular complication.  The benefit may refer to cost avoidance or risk 
reduction “but more commonly in biomedicine it refers to something of positive value, such as 
life or health” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009:222). 
 
I have already stated that although a plausible argument (on the basis of pathophysiology) can be 
made to advocate lifestyle modification for the woman who experienced pre-eclampsia during 
her pregnancy, there are currently no properly structured studies that answer this question 
conclusively.  In these circumstances beneficence is implemented through precautionary 
measures.  Although it has many different formulations, the “precautionary principle” 
encapsulated in the maxim “better safe than sorry” has been widely applied, including to the 
domain of public health.  “Depending on what is valued and what is at risk, it may be ethically 
justifiable and even obligatory to take steps in the absence of conclusive scientific evidence, to 
avoid a hazard where the harm would be both serious and irreversible” (Beauchamp & Childress, 
2009:229).  However, if the precautionary principle is to be applied responsibly, doctors should 
be careful not to distort or inflate risks to health. 
 
In the medical field with its limited resources, the principle of justice requires continual attention.  
While some believe primary care to be critical to healthcare “providing most care for most 
people, for most conditions most of the time” (Moon et al., 2008:475), the vexing question 
remains: should priority be given to treatment or prevention? Our moral intuitions may send us in 
opposite directions but in most systems the balance lies, understandably on the side of 
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expenditures for treatment rather than prevention. This is because treatment deals with concrete 
situations whereas the benefits through prevention are more abstract.  We would do well to 
remember that in many cases preventive care is more effective in saving lives.  It remains the 
responsibility of research scientists to provide robust evidence regarding the efficacy (or lack 
thereof) of prevention programmes in order to provide just and equitable allocation of resources. 
 
In its ideal form Starfield believes that primary care must be accessible, patient-centred, 
continuous and comprehensive (1998). 
 Accessibility often implies that the local clinics are in the community.  This gives these 
practitioners insight into the “multiple dimensions of patients’ preferences, including the 
influence of personal history, family and community” (Moon et al., 2008:475).  
 Patient-centred care incorporates the needs, values and goals of patients who are 
accorded “Kantian” respect as real people.  Kant argued that the basis for this respect is a 
person’s capacity for moral action, that is, for acting on the basis of impartial rules 
derived by reason.  The approach of shared decision making has already been addressed 
in the sections on counselling and consent.  The challenge for clinicians in primary care is 
to deal with patient goals, values and behaviour that are detrimental to health, e.g. 
working with the woman who will not stop smoking, control her weight or take 
medication. Here again, respect for autonomy wrestles with beneficence and paternalism 
comes into consideration.  Non-compliance that often seems to conflict with other values 
and behaviours, has been covered in Chapter Five, but continuous care allows the 
clinician time to revisit the situation. 
 Continuous care helps establish the doctor-patient relationship, but once the pregnancy is 
past, the role of the obstetrician comes to an end, although the obstetrician-gynaecologist 
may continue primary care in the latter role.  If this is not the case, the doctor is obliged to 
arrange for continuity of care through another provider so that the patient does not 
experience “abandonment”.  This is challenging within state health care systems with 
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rigid boundaries, but working relationships can be established amongst colleagues as 
illustrated in Case 4 (Chapter Five). 
 Comprehensive care requires the integration of the physical, psychological and social 
elements, as well as prevention into the care provided. 
 
9.3 Summary position 
 
The conditions of pre-eclampsia and other hypertensive diseases of pregnancy provide a unique 
opportunity to identify women and children at increased risk of cardiovascular and metabolic 
diseases in later life.  Cardiovascular morbidity and mortality represent end-points important 
enough to merit the application of beneficence in the form of the precautionary principle while 
still awaiting robust scientific support.  Prevention provided through primary care is well 
supported by many ethics principles. 
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CHAPTER TEN: THE PATH FORWARD 
 
Ethics in obstetrics is confounded by the complex relationship between a pregnant woman and 
her fetus.  In this thesis I have emphasised that pre-eclampsia is one of the most important 
conditions that an obstetrician will face, with many interfaces between clinical medicine and 
ethical principles that arise even before a pregnancy has begun and continue long after it has 
ended.  The aim of this thesis has been to highlight specific regularly encountered problem areas 
and discuss them in a bioethics context in order to assist clinicians in their decision-making and 
resolution of dilemmas in real-life. 
 
The most important frontier for pre-eclampsia remains effective prevention and/or curative 
therapy.  Both will bring peculiar ethical considerations to the pre-conception period and first 
trimester of pregnancy.  Pre-conception counselling and care is an area ripe for further 
developments.  Much attention has been focussed on genetic markers for pre-eclampsia but no 
strong, simple predictive genetic test has yet been identified.  Although genetic testing is widely 
applied in general obstetrics it remains a contentious topic.  In the future genetic screening for 
pre-eclampsia may become a reality and would therefore need to be incorporated into 
counselling. 
 
There is no medical cure for pre-eclampsia at present.  Delivery is the only definitive way of 
arresting and reversing this pregnancy-associated disease.  Research with e.g. anti-angiogenic 
factors or statins may hold the key to unlocking medical therapy.  Should such therapy become a 
possibility, all the ethical dilemmas of where and how to conduct the research in pregnant human 
subjects would need to be considered.  There would also be a moral responsibility to make 
effective treatment easily accessible in poor, developing countries that carry the greatest burden 
of disease.  On-going human research and the roll-out of antiretroviral medications for 
HIV/AIDS have provided the world with some salient lessons in this regard. 
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